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I. Introduction 
 
In 1973, the first creation of recombinant bacteria, E. coli, allowed for gene engineering.  
After this development, it was possible to create a genetically modified organism 
(GMO) by adding a new gene into an organism’s genome.1  A short time after this 
invention, the commercial value of these genetically modified products was discovered 
which resulted in the establishment of biotechnology companies.  Nowadays, GMOs 
have a wide application in biological and medical research, production of 
pharmaceutical drugs, experimental medicine and agriculture.2 
As agricultural biotechnology has become an agronomic alternative, discussion 
has emerged about what legal liabilities, if any, exist for those who create, distribute and 
produce transgenic seeds and crops.3  Many governments have debated legal liability 
tools in regards to agricultural biotechnology.4  This debate has also been influenced by 
numerous commentators – academics from several disciplines, government lawyers, and 
representatives from non-governmental organisations.  In this regard, the basic question 
is whether or not the current liability regimes provide an appropriate solution for 
liability claims in the field of agricultural GMO application.  
This thesis will examine existing liability rules in North America as well as 
Germany.  The starting point, however, will be an introduction into the scientific 
background and the terminology of genetics and genetic engineering in order to provide 
the necessary information for the understanding of the complex liability claims in the 
field of agricultural GMOs.  Following this, the thesis will, in particular, examine the 
risk potential of the use of these kinds of GMOs.  
                                                 
1
 In 1973 Stanley Cohen, Herbert Boyer, and others developed recombinant DNA (rDNA) molecules and 
the following year demonstrated the expression of foreign genes implanted in a bacterium by rDNA 
methods: Morrow, J.F., Cohen, S.N, Chang, A.C.Y., Boyer, H., Goodman, H., and Helling, R. 1974. 
Replication and transcription of eukaryotic in Escherichia coli. Proceedings of  National Academy of 
Sciences USA 71: 1743-1747.   
2
 See Taylor, 2007 10. 
3
 Ibid. 
4
 M Migus ‘GMO Statutory Liability Regimes: An International Review’ (2004) Canadian Institute for 
Environmental Law and Policy 3. 
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In addition, the aims of tort law will be presented in order to provide a basis for the 
question of whether or not the results of liability claims can be justified.  The main focus 
of this dissertation lies in the analysis of the legal liability laws in the previously 
mentioned jurisdictions.  Special attention in this regard will be given to five specific 
damage scenarios.  With regards to the North American liability regime, what will 
initially be examined is the role reasonable foreseeability, as a requirement of the tort of 
nuisance, plays in the assessment of liability resulting from innovations in 
biotechnology.  Using these results, the thesis will then analyse liability issues by 
presenting the statutory regimes from Germany with special regard to the German Law 
of Genetic Engineering (GenTG).  The comparison of the different jurisdictions seeks to 
clarify which of these regimes most appropriately deals with the liability issues raised 
by the production of agricultural GMOs.  
The thesis will conclude by using the results of the legal comparison to point out 
existing possibilities to secure equitable legal compensation in cases of GMO harm due 
to agricultural application. 
II. Genetically Modified Organisms (GMOs) in their present context5 
 
The legal problems arising out of the handling and application (use) of GMOs are due to 
the connection between nature, science and legal ramifications which are not 
understandable without a basic scientific background.  Therefore, this chapter will 
illustrate the natural science background of the manufacturing of GMOs.  In this 
context, the scientific terms, as well as the genetic manufacturing process, will be 
explained.  This is necessary for a good understanding of the dynamics at work within 
GMO-related legal liability issues.  
 
                                                 
5
 This chapter will deal with biotechnology Post-1973 which fundamentally based on the scientific 
achievements of J.F., Cohen and Herbert Boyer. See JF Cohen et al ‘Replication and transcription of 
eukaryotic in Escherichia coli’ (1974) 71 Proceedings of National Academy of Sciences USA 1974 at 
1743-1747.   
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A. Fundamentals of genetics and genetic engineering 
1. Terminology  
Genetic engineering covers every method which is necessary for analysis, isolation, 
transformation, composition or reproduction of the substrate of genetic information.6  
Genetic engineering is a sector of the broader field of biotechnology.7  ‘Biotechnology is 
a technique that uses living organisms (or parts of organisms) to make or modify 
products, to improve plants or animals or to develop microorganisms for specific uses.’8  
2. The Development of Genetic Engineering 
In 1973, the American scientists Stanley Cohen, Herbert Boyer, and others developed 
recombinant deoxyribonucleic acid (rDNA) molecules and, the following year, 
demonstrated the expression of foreign genes implanted in a bacterium by rDNA 
methods.9  Biotechnology, in general, can be divided into the new and the old.10  The 
new biotechnology (post 1973) is ‘based on a set of techniques for undertaking 
“precision” genetic and cell engineering that includes uses of rDNA, cell fusion, 
monoclonal antibodies, tissue culture technology, and novel bioprocessing methods’.11 
There are three different discoveries which are fundamental to new biotechnology which 
can be distinguished from traditional fermentation engineering and cross-breeding of 
animals and crops.12  These include the discovery of new classes of enzymes, DNA 
sequencing, and methods of transposing genes within and across species.13  
Furthermore, the new, discovered enzymes can be distinguished by their 
characteristics into different groups.  One of these enzymes called ‘restriction enzyme’ 
                                                 
6
 I Wildhaber Haftung fuer gentechnische Produkte (2009) 5. 
7
 Ibid. 
8
 Ian Taylor Genetically Engineered Crops (2007) 5.  
9
 J.F. Cohen and Herbert Boyer (note 5) at 1743-1747.   
10
 I Taylor (note 8) at 5.  
11
 Ibid. 
12
 Ibid. 
13
 Ibid.  
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is used to cut DNA at predictable sites.14  This special enzyme gave scientists the tool to 
isolate DNA sequences that could be reintegrated into other organisms.15  
Another group of enzymes called ‘ligases’ was found to seal the ends of DNA 
molecules.  The ligases are the ’chemical glue’ that gives scientists the ability to splice 
together segments of DNA from different organisms.  Lastly, an enzyme called reverse 
transcriptase transcribes single-stranded messenger ribonucleic acid (RNA) into double-
stranded DNA.  
The second important discovery has been the sequencing of genes.  Sequencing 
of genes is the process by which the precise nucleotide components of a gene are 
determined.16  Gene sequencing is ‘essential in order to understand which segments of 
DNA correspond with specific proteins, or how the coding and noncoding regions of 
DNA differ’.17  
The third discovery covers methods which can be used for transporting segments 
of DNA across biological systems.18 
3. The application of genetic engineering  
In genetic engineering, it is important to have the ability to isolate DNA parts.  This is 
achieved by the use of the already mentioned restriction enzymes.19  Today, hundreds of 
such restriction enzymes are known, all with different detection and fission 
characteristics.20 
Ligase is used to assemble different DNA fragments, previously part of various 
organisms, allowing the creation of new DNA combinations.21  A vector allows the 
                                                 
14
 I Wildhaber (note 6) at 12f. 
15
 Ibid.   
16
 I Taylor (note 8) at 5.  
17
 Ibid. 
18
 Ibid. 
19
 This restriction enzymes where discovered by Hamilton O. Smith and Daniel Nathans. See HG Gassen 
Der Stoff aus dem die Gene sind 2ed (1988) 47ff. 
20
 EL Winnacker Gene und Klonen, Eine Einfuehrung in die Biotechnologie (1984) 3ff.  
21
 I Wildhaber (note 6) at 13. 
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transferral of the already cut DNA fragments into cells.22  Common vectors are viruses, 
plasmids, phages, cosmids, and yeast artificial chromosomes (YACs).23  Different 
vectors vary with regards to their cloning capacity which means the size of the loadable 
DNA molecules.24  Furthermore, vectors enable the replication of integrated DNA 
fragments into a cell.25  
Bacteria have the negative quality that they assimilate only a small amount of 
external DNA.26  That is why cells are physically and chemically processed with the 
goal to achieve adhesion of external DNA to the cell membrane.27  These processed 
cells are called ‘competent’ and enable an easier assimilation of the DNA.28  There are 
different methods of attaining competent cells.  To achieve this goal, vectors which 
make the host resistant against antibiotics are used.  These vectors serve as selective 
markers inside the host DNA.29  After the use of selective markers, it is possible to 
distinguish transformed and untransformed cells and, as a result, to separate the 
transformed, antibiotic-resistant cells.30  There are also other separation processes that 
can be used during this phase.31 
B. Biotechnology: Different Types of GMOs  
After addressing the fundamental principle of biotechnology in general, an illustration of 
the different types of GMOs shall be conducted, with special regard to each arising risk 
scenario.  
In general, it is alleged that the products of genetically modified organisms could 
effectively be harmful - a thought that is supported by numerous product liability 
cases.32  There are several specifically characterised GM products, such as 
                                                 
22
 A Reineke Gentechnik – Grundlagen, Methoden und Anwendungen (2004) 71ff. 
23
 Ibid at 110ff.   
24
 I Wildhaber (note 6) at 13.  
25
 Ibid. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 Ibid. 
29
 Ibid.  
30
 EL Winnacker (note 20) at 373 ff.   
31
 JD Watson et al. Recombinant DNA 2ed (1992) 221ff.  
32
 Winterbottom v. Wright [1842] 152 Eng. Rep. 402. 
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microorganisms, animals and plants that could potentially raise cause for concern. 
Hence, it has to be determined if these products could have risk proximity in particular.  
Occurring damages could further lead to possible liability claims between the different 
right holders.  
Liability in general is caused due to an occurring damage.  The specific GMO 
damage risk is important for determining which duty of care is established to prevent 
any harm of legal objects.  Similarly, it seems clear that with rising risk, the demands of 
the level of duty of care are rising.33  This demand to determine the risk factor is 
strengthened by the point that possible tort of negligence requires foreseeability of the 
risk, which in turn requires that a risk exits.34  Moreover, unusually high damage 
proximity could influence the applicability of culpa-based liability claims like 
negligence in the common law model or § 823 of the German civil code.35  
For this purpose, what is meant by the term ’risk’ has to be defined.  This term 
derives from the Latin word ’risicare which means to dare’36and was defined by the 
World Health Organization (WHO) in 2000 as ’a probability of an adverse effect under 
specific circumstances.’37  The risk refers to any non-intentional injuring success.38  
Risk is built by the product, damage probability and size of the possible damage.39  
Accordingly, it is imperative to initially examine whether or not these products all have 
the same risk of harm and, as a result, if these products can be legally addressed in a 
similar way.   
1. GM Bacteria, Viruses, and Microorganisms  
The first group of GMOs encompasses the genetic modification of single-cell life forms 
such as bacteria, viruses and other microorganisms.  This biotechnology was a progeny 
                                                 
33
 P Osborne The Laws of Tort (2000) 13f.  
34
 L Khoury and Stuart Smyth ‘Reasonable Foreseeability and Liability in 
Relation to Genetically Modified Organisms’ (2007) 27 Bulletin of Science Technology Society 214 at 
216. 
35
 Buergerliches Gesetzbuch (BGB). 
36
 I Wildhaber (note 6) at 47.  
37
 I Wildhaber (note 6) at 47; O Kaeppeli  Bio –und Gentechnologie I (1994) at 100.  
38
 I Wildhaber (note 6) at 47. 
39
 O Kaeppeli (note 37) at 100.  
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of modern genetics that started in the early 1950s with the discovery by Watson and 
Crick in 1953 of the double helix in deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA).40  In 1973, 
Stanley Cohen, Herbert Boyer and others developed recombinant DNA (rDNA) and 
later demonstrated the expression of foreign genes implemented in a bacterium by 
rDNA methods.41  The GMO research continued throughout the 1970s and resulted in a 
greater understanding and heightening of concern about the future application of 
biotechnology.42  At the Gordon Conference on Nucleic Acids, in 1973, public attention 
was called for the first time to potential risks of GMO technology.43  The participating 
scientists ‘were concerned that unfettered pursuit of this research might engender 
unforeseen and damaging consequences for human health and the Earth’s ecosystems’.44  
At the Asilomar Conference in 1975, the risks of gene modification were addressed in a 
public debate.45  The conference’s focus was to talk about ‘the possible risks of the 
research, the conditions needed to ensure that the risks were adequately addressed, and 
such safety precautions as would be necessary to remove the moratorium and allow 
future research to proceed safely’.46  The striking aspect of this conference was that ‘the 
world’s leading experts on rDNA research developed the safety guidelines for 
subsequent research themselves, rather than having the guidelines developed and 
imposed on researchers by the government.’47 
It is imaginable that during outdoor tests, laboratory experiments, or by dint of 
transport, unintentional release of GMOs into the environment can occur, with the result 
that unaltered microorganisms are replaced or negative effects on the ground arise.48  
Furthermore, it is feared that GM bacteria could pass their genetic information to other 
organisms due to the creation of new plasmids which have the attribute of 
                                                 
40
 L Khoury and S Smyth (note 34) at 217. 
41
 I Taylor (note 8) at 4.  
42
 P Berg and M Singer ‘The recombinant DNA controversy: Twenty years later’ (1995) 92 Proceedings 
of the National Academy of Science at 9011.  
43
 L Khoury and S Smyth (note 34) at 217 
44
 P Berg and M Singer (note 42) at 9011. 
45
 L Khoury and S Smyth (note 34) at 217 
46
 Ibid. 
47
 Ibid. 
48
 D Parr Genetic engineering: Too good or to wrong? (1997) 4. 
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reproduction.49  Many field trials, and also basic research, in the field of gene transfer 
point out that an uncontrolled reproduction of GM bacteria is unlikely.50  This reduced 
risk scenario is also supported by the Exxon Oil Company patent for oil-eating 
microorganisms.  These oil-eating microorganisms were never actually commercialised 
because of the concerns around their release into the environment.51  Due to this reason, 
the first commercialisation of a genetically modified product took place late in 1983 in 
the form of insulin producing GMOs.52  These general concerns have had the effect that 
GM microorganisms are mostly produced and used in laboratories and closed facilities.  
2. GM Animals  
The second group of genetically modified organisms covers animals.  Research in this 
field was initiated in the 1970s and was focused on cancer treatment.53  In 1980, 
Gordon, Scangos, Plotkin, Barbosa and RuddleGenetic enabled the transformation of 
mouse embryos by microinjection of purified DNA.54  An example of a 
commercialisation in this group is the so-called ’Onco-mouse’, an experimental 
achievement by the Harvard University in 1988.55  This mouse had been modified to 
develop cancer and was supposed to be used in laboratory research.  Another 
commercialised development was a genetically modified goat.  This goat was modified 
with an inserted spider gene which codes for producing silk.  The goat’s milk produces 
silk at a much higher rate and with greater economies of scale than spiders do.56  The 
developer, Nexia Biotechnology, ensures in this case ‘that the goats and all their 
possible by-products do not come in contact with the human food supply chain’.57  
                                                 
49
 JP Morrissey and Walsh UF et al. ‘Exploitation of genetically modified inoculants for industrial 
ecology application’ (2002) 81 Antonie van Leeuwenhoek at 599ff.   
50
 RV Miller ‘Gentransfer zwischen Bakterien in der Natur’ (1998) Spektrum at 50ff.  
Available at http://www.spektrumverlag.de/artikel/824429  [Accessed 17 September 2009]. 
51
 L Khoury and S Smyth (note 34) at 217.  
52
 Ibid. 
53
 Ibid. at 218. 
54
 JW Gordon and GA Scangos et al. ‘Genetic transformation of mouse embryos by microinjection of 
purified DNA’ (1980) 77 Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA at 7380 ff.  
55
 European Patent Register entry for European patent no. 0169672 Available at 
http://register.epoline.org/espacenet/application?number=EP85304490  [Accessed 6 September 2009]. 
56
 L Khoury and S Smyth (note 34) at 218.  
57
 Ibid.  
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A change took place in 2004 when Yorktown Technologies of Austin, Texas started to 
sell genetically modified zebrafish, known as ‘GloFish’.  These fish contain a 
translucent jellyfish gene which allows them to glow in the dark.58 Despite the case of 
the GloFish being the only one of its kind and the unknown consequences of the GM 
animal application in the environment (especially in Europe), ethical objections still 
decrease the use of GM animals outside research and production facilities.  This 
examination is, furthermore, strengthened by the point that ‘aquarium fish are not used 
for food purposes’59; they consequently should not pose any threat to the food supply. 
3. GM Plants 
The final category of biotechnology covers genetically modified plants.  This category is 
of great importance since most of the global population’s food supply is gained out of 
plant products.60  For that reason, this thesis will focus on the application of GM plants.  
a) History of GM plant developments 
The first genetic modification of a plant was recorded in 1983 with tobacco as the host 
plant.61  Only a few years later, in 1985, the first patent on a genetically modified plant 
was granted.62  In the time following, the research in the agricultural GMO field grew 
rapidly by reason of the widespread application of field trials with different crop 
varieties.  It was only a question of time before the first commercialisation of genetically 
modified crops in China took place in 1992.63  Two years later, in 1994, Calgene made it 
possible to grow and purchase 10,000 acres of the transgenic, delayed-ripening tomato 
“FlavrSavr”.64  The FlavrSavr was, furthermore, the first genetically engineered food for 
                                                 
58
 NC Steward ‘Go with the glow: fluorescent proteins to light transgenic organisms’ (2006) 24 Trends in 
Biotechnology at 155ff.  
59
 FDA Statement Regarding Glofish Available at 
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/GeneticEngineering/GeneticallyEng
ineeredAnimals/ucm161437.htm [Accessed 6 September 2009].  
60
 G Dutfield Intellectual Property Rights, Trade and Biodiversity: Seeds and Plant Varieties (2000) 2. 
61
 L Khoury and S Smyth (note 34) at. 216. 
62
 Ibid. 
63
 C James and AF Krattiger ‘Global Review of the Field Testing 
and Commercialization of Transgenic Plant 1986 to 1995 The First Decade of Crop Biotechnology’ 
(1996). Available at https://www.isaaa.org/resources/publications/briefs/01/download/isaaa-brief-01-
1996.pdf [Accessed  9 September 2009]. 
64
 L Khoury and S Smyth (note 34) at 218. 
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which a license for human consumption has been granted.65  In 1995, other genetically 
modified crops were introduced, including cotton, canola, potatoes, and maize.66  Since 
these initial projects, the scope of scientific research in this field has covered a huge 
amount of different GM varieties, including cereals, oilseed, fruits and vegetables.  
b) Risks for the environment 
(1) Gene flow and spreading of GM plants 
Before a GM plant is allowed to be grown, what negative results could arise for the 
environment must be examined.  In 1996, the biologists Mikkelsen et al. proved that 
herbicide-resistance-coding transgenes could chip out in the first generation in a related 
wild species.67  The possibility that GM pollen could spread out was also recognised in 
the Northwestern United States after a strain of transgenic grass, bred for golf courses, 
spread out.68  The proximity of gene spreading is dependent on region and plant 
species.69  On the one hand, canola in particular has the characteristic to spread out 
easily inside the cultivated plant species as well as related wild species.70  On the other 
hand, wheat has a minimised risk of outspreading due to the fact that this plant species is 
a self-pollinator.71  Moreover, ‘step by step’ principles in the form of specific distances 
of acreage seem to be useful in isolating the GM plants and avoiding affecting the 
environment. 
                                                 
65
 Ibid. 
66
 Ibid. 
67
 TR Mikkelsen and B Andersen et al. ‘The risk of crop transgene spread’ (1996) 380 Nature at 31.  
68
 M Hopkin ‘Escaped GM grass could spread bad news’ Available at 
http://www.nature.com/news/2006/060811/full/news060807-17.html [Accessed 7 September 2009]. 
69
 T Clarke ‘Crop's weed crossings highlight GM fears’ Available at 
http://www.nature.com/news/2003/031010/full/news031006-13.html [Accessed 7 September 2009]. 
70
 I Wildhaber (note 6) at 50.  
71
 GMO Compass. Available at http://www.gmo-
compass.org/eng/safety/environmental_safety/188.wheat.html [Accessed 24 July 2009]. 
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(2) Unintended plant physiological transformation 
Other damage risks could arise due to unintended plant transformation.  These risks are 
unexpected due to the fact that they are not connected to the gene product or were not 
known before the transformation happened.72  The risk of damage would arise if an 
integration of a genetically modified gene changes the expression of close genes with 
the negative result of toxic metabolic pathways being activated.73  
(3) Herbicide-resistant vermin 
Another problem could arise in the way of herbicide-resistant vermin due to the high 
selective pressure in the field of Bt-maize.  ‘Bt-corn is a variant of maize, genetically 
altered to express the bacterial Bt toxin, which is poisonous to insect pests’.74  The 
gene-manipulated plants produce the Bt toxin throughout the whole growing season.  
Following this, vermin could be able to develop new defence mechanisms.75  A way of 
reducing the risk of herbicide resistance is the application of multi-herbicide 
resistance;76 but since the first application of Bt-plants, a special accelerated herbicide 
resistant has not appeared.77  
(4) Undesirable effects on soil life 
Herbicide-resistant GM plants could have adverse effects on soil life.  Scientists stated, 
in 1999, that larva of the monarch butterfly (danaus plexippus) which lives on Bt-maize 
pollinated ‘vincetoxicum hirundinaria’ show a higher death rate.78  This study was later 
withdrawn because the same author later stated that ‘Pollen from genetically modified 
corn plants which contain the insecticidal Bt toxin’ are ‘not a significant danger to North 
American monarch butterflies’.79  This statement was made due to the availability of 
                                                 
72
 I Wildhaber (note 6) at 52.  
73
 W Pawloski and Somers et al. ‘Transgenic DNA integrated into the oat genome is frequently 
interspersed by host DNA’ (1998) 95 The National Academy of Science at 12106. 
74
 R Bessin Bt-Corn:What it is and how it works. Available at 
http://www.ca.uky.edu/entomology/entfacts/entfactpdf/ef130.pdf  [Accessed 7 September 2009]. 
75
 YB Liu and E Bruce et al. ‘Development time and resistance to Bt-Crops’ (1999) 400 Science at 519.  
76
 I Wildhaber (note 6) at 53. 
77
 BE Tabashnik and F Jeffrey et al. ‘DNA Screening reveals pink bollworm resistance to Bt cotton 
remains Rare after a decade of exposure’ (2006) 99 Journal of Economic Entomology at 1525ff.   
78
 J Losey and L Rayor et al. ‘Transgenic pollen harms monarch larvae’ (1999) 399 Nature at 214.    
79
 T Clarke ‘GM plant pollen may be off the hook, but regulators are still feeling the heat’ Available at 
http://www.nature.com/news/2001/010912/full/news010913-12.html [Accessed 22 December 2009].  
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new research results.  The scientists analysed the leaves of ‘Asclepias syriaca’ and 
concluded that the pollen concentration on the leaves were not sufficient to harm 
monarch butterflies.80  Furthermore, it was stated that only a part of the monarch 
butterfly population feeds next to the maize fields.81  Moreover, in the opinion of the 
scientists, the pollen flow did not overlap with the occurrence of the monarch 
butterfly.82  
Finally, in June 2007, a report provided the information that ‘fields of transgenic 
cotton and corn contain more non-target insects than those of traditional crops sprayed 
with insecticides’.83 
c) Risks for humans due to the application of GM food 
As a matter of principle, the negative impacts of food are classified into toxic and 
non-toxic food reactions.84  Toxic food reactions concern all customers and are based on 
the growing and manufacturing process of GM plants.85  Non-toxic food productions 
could be important for people with a specific allergy or intolerance due to components 
of the product.86 
(1) Toxic reactions  
Agricultural GM food could have the ability to change existing or unanticipated toxic 
characteristics of food.87 
Some scientists have pointed out that gene insertion can lead to an increase in 
levels of naturally occurring toxins.88  Studies have been conducted involving 
recombinant yeast cells, ‘where genes from yeast were cloned and then reintroduced 
through conventional GE techniques.  The analyses showed a threefold increase in the 
                                                 
80
 Ibid. 
81
 Ibid. 
82
 Ibid. 
83
 H Ledford ‘Transgenic crops relatively kind to insects’ Available at 
http://www.nature.com/news/2007/070607/full/news070604-9.html [Accessed 22 August 2009]. 
84
 I Wildhaber (note 6) at 57. 
85
 Ibid. 
86
 Ibid. 
87
 I Taylor (note 8) at 85.  
88
 Ibid. 
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accumulation of an enzyme in the glycolytic pathway and a 40 to 200 fold increase in 
the production of methyl-glyoxal, a substance that is toxic and mutagenic in high 
concentrations’.89  Furthermore, many GM crops contain a promoter from the 
cauliflower mosaic virus which is named ‘CaMV 35S’ transcript.90  Michael Hansen 
stated that ‘the CaMV 35S promoter effectively puts the transgene outside of virtually 
any regulatory control by the host genome as the natural plant promoters for each gene 
allow’.91  Moreover, CaMV 35S has the ability to affect gene expressions thousands of 
base pairs upstream and downstream from the insertion site on a given chromosome and 
even alter the behaviour of genes on other chromosomes. but a present effect on human 
health is still not clearly stated.92  Overall, it seems clear that ‘in general, very little is 
known about the potential long-term effects of any foods, and that identification of such 
effects may be very difficult, if not impossible, due to the many confounding factors and 
the great genetic variability in food-related effects among the population’.93  
(2) Allergenicity 
Allergic reactions to food arise of adverse immunological reactions to proteins and, to a 
lesser extent, other components in food.94  Approximately two per cent of people, 
including eight per cent of children, in industrialised countries are affected by food 
allergies.95  The genetic modification of food could cause an allergenic reaction to it due 
to the introduction of a foreign gene or an alteration in gene expression.  On the one 
hand, it is reported by the Royal Society that ‘there is presently no evidence that GM 
foods that are commercially available cause any clinical manifestations of allergenicity, 
and assertions to the contrary have not been supported by systematic analysis’. 96  The 
risks to human health associated with the use of specific viral DNA sequences in GM 
                                                 
89
 Ibid.  
90
 Ibid.  
91
 Ibid. 
92
 Ibid.  
93
 HA Kuiper and GA Kleter ‘Assessment of the food safety issues related to genetically 
modified foods’ (2001) 27 The Plant Journal at 505.  
94
 I Wildhaber (note 6) at 58. 
95
 I Taylor (note 8) at 82.  
96
 The Royal Society ‘Genetically modified plants for food use and human health –an update’ at p. 7 
Available at http://royalsociety.org/displaypagedoc.asp?id=11319 [Accessed 30 August 2009].  
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
- 14 - 
 
plants should be negligible.97  On the other hand, two cases provide evidence that there 
is a risk that gene coding for allergens and immunogens may be inadvertently 
transferred into the human food supply.98 
In the first case, Pioneer Hi-Breed99 was in the process of developing GM 
soybeans which contained a gene which coded for a methionine-rich protein from Brazil 
nuts.100  Julie Nordlee et al. proved that a major Brazil nut allergen had been transferred 
to Pioneer Hi-Bred soybeans.101  
The second case involved Starlink corn.102  Tests showed that cryc9c, the toxin 
encoded in the corn due to Bt gene insertion, was resistant to human digestion.103  Due 
to this analysis, the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA) restricted this corn 
to animal consumption.104  A discussion of the Starlink case would go beyond the scope 
of this chapter.  A detailed and specific discussion, however, will be provided in chapter 
IV.  
4. Discussion  
Firstly, one cannot deny that GM products in general have risks for legally protected 
interest.  Furthermore, GM products concern almost every area of life.  It was illustrated 
that there are different groups of GM application, each with their differences.  On the 
one hand, GM microorganisms (incl. bacteria and viruses) as well as GM animals are 
generally handled in laboratories.  This limited handling results in restricted contact with 
legally protected interests.  This, in turn, results in a lower level of risk, which could be 
important in a potential liability claim for negligence.  Moreover, this lower risk level 
allows for the conclusion that a lower amount of damages cases, as well as an increased 
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amount of loss, seems to be possible.  On the other hand, GM plants are used in 
agriculture and as food in North America.  Moreover, GM plants were also introduced in 
limited field trials in Europe.  Due to the practical application of GM plants, the GM 
materials appear to be in direct contact with human health, farmer’s property rights as 
well as economic interests.  Damages, with regards to the already mentioned gene flow, 
toxic and allergic reaction of GM plants, are more likely or at least possible.  
Consequently, this examination shows that a specific liability rule for the purposes of 
managing GM plants is needed.  It would have to deal with irreversible, different and 
huge damage in a satisfactory way.  As a result, an application of GM plants demands a 
need for quicker legal action and, additionally, a broader necessity of regulation.  The 
existence of the GloFish seems to be due to commercialisation and an exception to the 
mentioned risk distinction between the different GM groups.  This animal appears not to 
share the same level of risk as the group of plants on the basis that this product is set 
apart ‘because tropical aquarium fish are not used for food purposes’105 and they are in 
the domestic isolation of a fish tank.  Therefore, there is a total isolation in this instance 
in terms of risk and the GloFish will never transmit genes to the wild type variety, the 
zebrafish.  Consequently, the GloFish does not pose any threat to the food supply.106  
According to this examination, the liability uniqueness of agricultural GMO application 
is established.  For this reason, it is necessary to examine how a satisfactory liability 
system should handle some key legal issues.  The ethicist Sass says ‘…cooperation in 
the sharing of responsibility between all parties involved…is what I call the marriage of 
ethics and expertise’.107  Consequently, the management of the question of liability is of 
particular importance concerning the risk of GM plants. 
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III. The aims and scope of tort law 
The second chapter has provided basic information about GMO technology and possible 
adverse effects.  The following chapter will illustrate that the occurring risk under the 
new GMO technology has to be balanced due to freedom aspirations and purposes of 
society.  Furthermore, it will be shown that tort law tries to enable coexistence between 
the development and introduction of new technologies and the protection of already 
recognised legal rights.  
A legal order would be unnecessary if the citizen would live in permanent 
harmony.108  The reality is that individual interests are continually in a state of real or 
threatened conflict.109  The previous chapter has shown that the introduction of GMOs 
produce risks in several fields.  This conflict creates a field of tension between the legal 
spheres of the legally affected persons and the state.  Consequently, a solution is needed 
to settle the originated conflicts and to allow satisfactory coexistence.  The law of torts 
and the law of Delict determine which interests are recognised by liability law and, 
furthermore, under which circumstances they are protected against infringement.110  The 
wrongdoer has an ‘obligation’ to compensate for the damage suffered; and the injured 
person has the right to claim a particular amount of compensation.111  As a result, a legal 
obligation is created between both parties which attach the law of tort as part of private 
law known as the ‘law of obligations’.112  
There are several opinions on this matter and each considers the aims of tort law 
in different ways.  The first opinion understands tort law as an ethical system which 
promotes the responsibilities of wrongdoers for the damage they have caused to other 
people.113  This understanding leads to the conclusion that it is the tort law’s function to 
correct injustice between legal persons.  The second opinion ‘suggests that tort law is a 
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legal construct designed to achieve a number of identifiable functions’114 like 
compensation, punishment, deterrence, education and the ombudsman role.  All of these 
functions are in the public interest.115  This conflict of different opinions of what the role 
of tort law is does not have to be solved due to the fact that both opinions try to achieve 
a result that establishes a harmonic society with satisfied individuals. 
It was further pointed out that one of the demands of tort law is to protect 
specific interests.116  Based on this, what interests could be affected in the case of 
agricultural GMO application should be examined during the case study.  The second 
step should determine if these interests are appropriately protected by current liability 
systems.  In order to identify protectable interests, examination of possible liability 
claims is required.  At this juncture, the emphasis shall be on claims which have a 
connection to pure economic loss due to the widespread practical implication of 
economical damages.   
In the field of the Common Law and Civil Law system several potential 
scenarios for agricultural GMO damage claims exist.  
Firstly, it is imaginable that damage arises from the application of an unapproved 
GM crop which is mixed with commercial agricultural crops.117  
In a second scenario, it could be possible that damages arise from an approved 
transgenic crop compounding with non-transgenic crops resulting in a loss of a premium 
for a person or company who intended to sell a non-transgenic commodity or food 
product.118 
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In a third scenario, damages could arise from an approved transgenic crop mixing with 
organic crops resulting in a loss of the organic label for the specific organic crop or of 
organic certification for the organic farmer’s farm.119  
A fourth scenario depicts the possibility that damages could arise from the loss 
of market access in the case of a buyer deciding against buying a farmer’s crop even 
though there is no evidence of transgenic material or the evidence of transgenic material 
is below legally-set thresholds.120  
Furthermore, a fifth scenario demonstrates the possibility of damages arising 
from a decision by a farmer to forgo planting a particular crop because of concern about 
proximity to transgenic crops or market perception about transgenic crops.  
Scenario-related case studies will be addressed in detail in chapter IV.  After 
addressing the possible claims and interests, the law has to define if, and possibly how, 
such an infringement may be restored.121  The basis in law is that damage rests where it 
falls, which means that, each person must bear the damage he suffers (res perit 
domino).122  This rule, deduced from fundamental justice thinking, expresses the idea 
that every legal person has to consider their own risk of life.123  Nevertheless, damage 
does not always rest where it falls.  An exception to the above rule is needed in some 
cases due to the fact that an injured person might not accept the status quo and as a 
result many injured people might not be able to live peacefully or according to the law 
together with the injurers in a common society.  
In summary, the law determines the circumstances under which a person has to 
bear the damage which he caused.124  That is why it is desirable to examine if such a 
special case in regard to agricultural GMOs does exist.  In any case, the plaintiff needs a 
special reason in order to have a promising claim be exempt from the principle ‘res perit 
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domino’.  The dissertation will have a closer look at these aspects with special focus on 
economical damages.  
Economical damages are connected to farmers’ demands for GM-free products.  
Yet, in this context it has to be borne in mind that problems can also arise without the 
interference of GMO crops.  For that reason, it may be possible to address the issue of 
liability in cases of GMO crops within general liability regimes.  However, due to 
possible irreversible gene transfer (chipping out), the results of which are currently 
widely unclear, GM agriculture products create unique legal problems including 
difficulties regarding premium classes and organic labelling requirements on specific 
markets.  This consideration is strengthened by the point that numerous people express 
their concerns in relation to GM products, especially in Europe.  Therefore, it might be 
necessary to address GMO liability claims in a more specialised system.  The following 
chapter will take a closer look at these issues and raise the question whether or not a 
general liability regime which has been used to deal with conventional agricultural 
liability cases provides an appropriate framework to deal with GMO interferences. 
In this chapter, however, it can be concluded that a legal liability application in 
several cases of agricultural GMO interferences does exist and further that a basic 
exception of the ‘res perit domino’ principle seems possible in general. 
IV. Legal liability systems 
The introduction to different legal liability systems in this section of the discussion will 
allow the possibility for the examination of different systems that deal with liability 
issues in the field of agricultural GMOs.  
The first section will deal with the civil law in Canada and the United States of 
America.  The US and Canada were chosen due to the fact that the legal system in these 
countries is based on common law.125  An additional reason is that Canada and the 
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United States of America produce between seven and ten million tons of canola seed per 
year126 which impacts the occurrence of liability applications hugely.  Since GMO 
production is a recent scientific development, the question must be raised whether or not 
the ‘older’ tort law system is capable of dealing adequately with legal concerns arising 
from the GMOs’ presence. 
A. Legal Liability: Canada and the United States of America (USA) 
In the Canadian and American legal systems, legal liability can be classified into three 
general types: civil liability, administrative liability and criminal liability.  This 
dissertation will only deal with civil liability due to its high practical relevance in cases 
of agricultural GMO application. 
1. Introduction 
The legal system in North America is characterised as ‘common law’.127  Liability law 
consists of several causes of actions (torts).  Tort law can be characterised as law created 
by judges as part of common law and in cases where the law is grounded on a legislature 
act, as statutory law.  Legislature has the ability to reverse common law judgments, 
rejecting either particular rules or supplanting a whole area of the law.128  In Canada and 
the USA, the fields of damages which are caused by transgenic crops are not addressed 
by any specific statutory liability regimes.129  Therefore, a potential plaintiff is referred 
‘to several causes of action (torts) from which to choose for the legal pleadings that 
formally present the case (plaintiff v. defendant) to the court’.130  
2. Origins of tort law 
After this introduction into ‘common law’, the following part of the discussion will take 
a closer look at the origin of tort law.  This historical background information will be 
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helpful in regards to comparison with the German ‘Civil Law System’, which will be 
dealt with in chapter IV. 
The origin of the Canadian tort law is grounded ‘in the thousand-year evolution 
of the English common law of torts’.131  In contrast, the system of continental Europe is 
derived from Roman law.  England has never absorbed Roman law principles due to the 
work of the ‘Inns of Court’ and rather developed its law from national sources.132  Due 
to the beginning of colonisation, these achievements in liability law of the English ‘Inns 
of Court’ formed the basis of the North American Law.133  
3. Causes of Action  
It is of fundamental relevance to consider in detail the causes of action (torts) of GMO 
cases.  In Canada and the US, a plaintiff who is claiming civil liability harm caused by a 
GM crop ‘has several torts from which to choose for the legal pleadings that formally 
present the case (plaintiff v. defendant) to the court’.134  Generally, in Canada and the 
United States, the plaintiff has the opportunity to bring more than one tort in the same 
case, if the plaintiff has a reasonable basis to believe that they can provide facts that 
establish each tort set forth in the legal pleadings.135  Therefore, the GMO-significant 
torts, namely negligence, nuisance, trespass and the rule of stricter liability will be 
introduced hereinafter.  
a) Tort of negligence 
This section seeks to examine how uncertainties related to biotechnology developments 
affect or could affect the evaluation of the impact of reasonable foreseeability under the 
tort of negligence.  
Reasonable foreseeability is a principal requirement under the tort of negligence, 
which can be used for a claim for property damage and financial loss injuries due to 
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biotechnology activities.136  The tort of negligence is composed of a number of different 
elements.137  Most of these elements have to be proved by the plaintiff.138  These 
elements are the ‘negligent act’, ‘causation’ and ‘damage’.139  With regards to the 
negligent act, this element ‘is determined by identifying the appropriate standard of care 
and applying it to the facts of the case’.140  Moreover, reasonable foreseeability is an 
important aspect of the duty of care, breach of the standard of care, and a potentially 
legal causation. 
(1) Duty of Care 
A person owes a duty of care toward all those people whom one may contemplate as 
being reasonably foreseeable.141  The plaintiff, as a particular individual, need not have 
been contemplated, but the general class of persons to which he belongs must be 
foreseeable.142  However, under Canadian common law, a simple demonstration of 
reasonable foreseeability is not sufficient to establish a specific duty of care.143  This is 
due to the fact that the plaintiff must demonstrate proximity between himself and the 
defendant.144  This implies the obligation to prove that the defendant was in a close and 
direct relationship with the plaintiff.  If a plaintiff is successful in proving proximity, a 
duty of care is ‘prima facie’ established.  However, another requirement still has to be 
fulfilled in this case.  It is further necessary to ask if remaining policy considerations 
exist which could justify the denial of liability claims.  Residual policy considerations 
can include the effect of recognising the present duty of care on other legal obligations, 
the impact of the imposition of the duty of care on the legal system, as well as the effect 
of imposing liability on society in general.145  It can be stated that Canadian common 
law courts are generally reluctant to extend duties of care to broad classes of potential 
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and much less so to the public at large.146  The already mentioned debates about how far 
GM pollen and seeds may travel from one field to another field therefore affects, to 
some extent, the identification of the reasonably foreseeable class likely to suffer injury 
as a result of the spread of GM crops. 
(2) Breach of the Duty of Care 
The requirement of reasonable foreseeability is also an essential consideration in the 
courts’ analysis if the defendant has breached his duty of care toward the plaintiff.147  In 
this context, it has to be asked if a reasonable person placed in the defendant’s position 
would have foreseen that some harm could flow from his actions and taken precautions 
against it.148  The examination is basically objective, but special knowledge available at 
the time of the events must be taken into account.149 
Following this, available information within the research community, as well as 
common research efforts by the industry itself, could have a direct impact on the courts’ 
analysis of the reasonable foreseeability of the damage.  The level of knowledge 
available in the industry may give the courts some indication of what they can expect 
reasonable foresight to consist of at a specific point in time.150  
It could be argued that governmental approval for GM varieties requires a 
precedent-based risk assessment.  Therefore, it could be concluded that if a technology 
is considered to be safe, unknown risks could not be seen as unforeseeable.151  In sharp 
contrast to this rule, however, the Canadian Supreme Court ruled in 1999 that 
compliance with legislation does not immunise defendants from liability and cannot be 
used to avoid their basic obligation of taking reasonable care.152  Furthermore, in 
Canadian law, a breach of a specific statute or regulation does not constitute a 
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negligence claim, per sé.153  However, such a breach is admissible as evidence of 
negligence.154  In the past, Canadian courts have proven agreeable to departing from 
statutory or regulatory standards when they believe them to be unreasonable.155  This 
Court distancing itself from the regulatory compliance justification is of great interest 
due to the fact that Canadian regulatory agencies have been criticised in the past for 
being under industry’s influence in deciding whether to grant the application of GMOs 
in the environment.156  This criticism is based on the fact that the agencies ‘rely heavily 
on data and information provided by the biotechnology companies’157 while conducting 
their approval decision.  
(3) Legal causation 
Reasonable foreseeability is also the basic ‘concept at the basis of the demonstration of 
whether there is a sufficient “legal” or “proximate” causal relationship between the 
plaintiff’s injury and the defendant’s negligence’.158  The requirement of factual 
‘causation is established by showing a link between the defendant’s negligent act and 
the plaintiff’s damage’.159  In this case, it has to be decided if liability must be attributed 
totally or partially to the defendant (legal causation).160  The condition of legal causation 
is fulfilled if the manner or the extent of the damage which has been suffered by the 
plaintiff was reasonably foreseeable.161  
However, there is no scientific proof needed as to the link between the activity 
and its potential effects.162  The courts stated that it is enough if the defendant can 
reasonably foresee the specific type of ‘injury that can “possibly” flow from the activity 
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in question’.163  As was previously mentioned, existing objective knowledge concerning 
risks plays an important role in assessing legal causation.164  Generally, the more 
uncertainty there is as to the relationship between the release of a GMO and the 
potential injury suffered by the victim at the time the activity was undertaken, the less 
likely it is that the courts will find that the injury was foreseeable.165  This means that 
uncertainty, as well as lack of reliable scientific data about the effect of genetic 
modifications on living organisms, could act as a legal shield for the manufacturer or 
patent holder from liability.  It is, therefore, what uncertainty surrounds the “type of 
injuries” that can flow from genetic modifications of seeds and plants that needs to be 
examined.166  
The level of uncertainty depends on the type of injury which is involved.  As 
proven previously, a general damage risk does exist in the field of agricultural GMOs.167  
Consequently, the level of uncertainty depends on the type of injury involved, 
whether injury to economic and property interests, to health, or to ecosystems.168  
b) Tort of private nuisance 
Private nuisance may be best described as an unlawful interference with a person’s use 
or enjoyment of land or some right over, or in connection with it.169  The tort of private 
nuisance is applicable to indirect physical or intangible interference with property and 
all direct interference which is not physical.170  Furthermore, private nuisance is 
considered as a form of stricter liability, which means that it is not required that the 
defendant knew about the risk of his action.171  Nevertheless, ‘private nuisance is not 
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applicable unless the interference is unreasonable and the plaintiff has suffered some 
damage’.172  
Private nuisance is an act which, without being trespass (not physical), interferes 
with a person’s enjoyment of his land or premises or a right which he has over the land 
of another person.173  Following this, ‘the plaintiff must claim reasonable use and 
enjoyment reflective of the character of the locality where the plaintiff’s land lies and 
reflective of what normal persons, as opposed to especially sensitive persons, may 
reasonably expect from neighbours’.174  ‘The primary function of nuisance is to draw an 
appropriate balance between the defendant’s interest in using land as he pleases and the 
plaintiff’s interest in the use and enjoyment of land’.175  
c) Tort of trespass on land 
A claim under the tort of trespass requires the direct physical interference upon the 
property of the plaintiff by the defendant or things (animals, equipment, substances, or 
particles) under the defendant’s control.176  The defendant’s interference with the land 
has to be intentional or negligent.177  The burden of proof is, however, on the 
defendant’s side.178  The plaintiff needs to prove only a direct interference with his 
land.179  In this case, the defendant has to show a lack of intention or negligence to avoid 
a claim under the tort of trespass.180  Furthermore, under this tort it is not necessary to 
prove that the defendant intended to do a wrongful act against the plaintiff possessor.181  
Moreover, the intention to intrude on, or interfere with land that is, in fact, in the 
possession of the plaintiff, is sufficient.  In this case a mistake on the part of the 
defendant is no defence.182 Trespass is actionable without proof of damage.183 Following 
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this, every unauthorised intrusion onto the plaintiff’s land, no matter how trivial, is 
actionable.184 However, the interference must be ‘physical’.185 Furthermore, the tort of 
trespass may provide case wise a remedy.186 
d) Strict liability 
The distinguishing feature of strict liability torts is that there is no need to prove that the 
defendant is guilty of any wrongful (intentional or negligent) conduct.187  Following 
this, it is sufficient to impose liability to prove that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s 
loss in a manner prescribed.  The torts of strict liability include the rule in Rylands v 
Fletcher.188  This case dealt with an earthen water reservoir which failed and flooded the 
plaintiff’s coal mine.189  The reservoir had been built by contractors on land occupied by 
the defendant.190  The contractors where negligent and built the reservoir over disused 
mine shafts connecting to the plaintiff’s mining operation.191  The contractors have not 
been sued due to the fact that they were not employees of the defendant.192  
Furthermore, the defendant was not liable for the negligence because he did not employ 
the contractors.193  In this case, the plaintiff’s claim, therefore, depended on the 
recognition of a strict liability for the break out of the water.  The court drew on ancient 
strict liability for damage caused by dangerous animals, cattle trespass and some early 
nuisance cases and stated ‘that the person who for his own purposes brings on his land 
… must keep it in his peril and if he does not do so he is prima facie answerable for all 
the damage which is the natural consequence of the escape’.194  
The House of Lords dismissed the defendant’s appeal, but in the course of his 
judgment, Lord Cairns introduced the concept of a non-natural use of land and 
                                                                                                                                                
183
 Ibid. 
184
 Ibid. 
185
 Ibid. 
186
 Ibid at 255. 
187 Ibid.  
188 Rylands v Fletcher (1868) LR 3 HL 330. 
189 Ibid. 
190 Ibid. 
191 Ibid. 
192 Ibid. 
193 Ibid. 
194 Rylands v Fletcher (1866) LR 1 Ex 265 at 279-280.LR 1 Ex 265 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
- 28 - 
 
concluded that no liability could be demanded for the natural run-off water from higher 
land to the lower land.195  In the case of Rylands v Fletcher, the defendant had 
artificially collected water and a strict liability was appropriated for this non-natural use 
of land.196  This special concept has played a central role within the evolution of this 
tort. 
(1) Non-natural Use of Land 
As previously outlined, the requirement of non-natural use of land is an essential 
element of strict liability in the case of Rylands v Fletcher.197  This circumstance raises 
the question of what the definition of this term actually is.  Today, non-natural use has a 
different meaning from that initially described by Lord Cairns.  In his new definition, 
non-natural use is described as artificial, foreign, or not arising in the course of 
nature.198  The pivotal case in this context was Rickhard v Lothian199 which dealt with 
the escape of water from a domestic plumbing system.  In this case, the court defined a 
non-natural use of land as a ‘special use [of land] bringing with it increased danger to 
others, and must not merely be the ordinary use of the land or such a use as is proper for 
the general benefit of the community’.200  Following this definition, the defendant’s 
plumbing system cannot be regarded as a non-natural use of land.  The seeds of future 
confusion and uncertainty about the specific meaning of non-natural use were sown by 
this landmark case due to the fact that there was no consistency in the mentioned terms 
in this judgment.201  
However, the cases indicate two general categories of non-natural use.  The first 
category includes uses of land which are commonly regarded by the public as dangerous 
in themselves.202  This includes the storage of water in bulk; the manufacture and use of 
explosives; fumigation with poisonous gas; the bulk storage of transportation of natural 
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gas, propane, dangerous chemicals, or gasoline; the storage or use of nuclear materials 
and the storage or use of dangerous biological agents.203  In general, these land uses are, 
in almost all circumstances, highly dangerous and they, consequently, demand the 
application of strict liability.204 
The second category covers uses of land which do not carry the same degree of 
danger.  The cases in this category are more balanced and consideration is given to all 
the relevant factors set out in Rickhards v Lothian, including the degree of danger of the 
land use, the utility and normality of the land use, and the specific circumstances of time 
and place.205  It seems as difficult to predict what causes a non-natural use of land.  In 
Mihalchuk v Ratke206 the defendant farmer sprayed herbicide on his land from an 
aircraft.  Over time, some of the herbicide drifted onto the plaintiff’s property and 
damaged the plaintiff’s crops.207  In this case, the court concluded that spraying in this 
manner was a non-natural use of the defendant’s land and, therefore, liability was 
imposed.208  Furthermore, the judgment stated that the use of an airplane and the mixture 
of oil and herbicide increased the danger of herbicide drifting onto the plaintiff’s 
crops.209  
In the case Gertsen v Metropolitan Toronto (Municipality of) the defendant 
municipality disposed of garbage in a landfill adjacent to a residential area.  As the 
organic material decomposed, it produced methane gas which drifted, over time, onto 
the plaintiff’s land and accumulated in his garage.  The gas ignited when he was starting 
his car and he was injured.  The court ruled that this proceeding was a non-natural use of 
land.  Furthermore, the court placed special emphasis upon the time, place and 
circumstances of the land use.  The dumpsite was located in a small gorge nearby a 
residential neighbourhood and there was also no compelling public need for such an 
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application in this area.210  This type of decision is typical in this category of non-natural 
use due to the fact that they are highly fact-specific and involve a juggling of the various 
Rickhards factors in no fixed pattern.211  Therefore, it can be concluded that these cases 
have only a little precedential value.212 
(2) The Escape of Something Likely to Cause Mischief 
Another essential element of the rule in Rylands v Fletcher is the escape of something 
likely to cause mischief from land controlled by the defendant.  There are two 
components of this element: mischievous things and escape.213  
The term ‘mischief’ is, nowadays, quite useless due to the fact that the concept 
of non-natural use carries the implication of special danger.214  However, the element 
‘escape from land’ remains as an essential element of liability.215  Canadian courts had it 
in mind in the past to reduce the effect of the escape component to have the opportunity 
to address all the losses which are generated by ultrahazardous activities.216  
Nevertheless, due to the need to establish some sort of a limitation, the escape 
component remains as essential and confining in the field of liability law.217  
4. Causes of action in an agricultural GMO context 
a) Overview 
Using these four common law causes of action (negligence, nuisance, trespass and the 
rules of stricter liability) several potential scenarios for damage claims exist.  The first 
possibility is that a claim could be brought to court for damages arising from an 
unapproved transgenic crop mixing with commercial agricultural crops.218  
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The United States covered the above scenario with the ‘StarLink™’ litigation, which 
dealt with legal liability claims arising from an unapproved transgenic crop 
commingling with commercial agricultural crops.219  StarLink™ was a GM corn 
approved only for animal feed as well as ethanol production, but not permitted for 
human food supply.  When ‘StarLink™’ corn mixed with corn for human food 
demands, farmers filed lawsuits against the developer Aventis Cropscience USA.220  
The various lawsuits were finally consolidated into a single, class action lawsuit in the 
United States Federal Court for the Northern District of Illinois.221  In the ensuing legal 
proceedings, the trial judge ruled that plaintiffs who could prove that their crop or stored 
grain had been physically contaminated by unapproved StarLink™ – making their crops 
and cereals unmarketable as food corn due to the adulteration by an unapproved 
substance – had a viable legal claim through negligence, private nuisance, and public 
nuisance.222  After these rulings, the parties to the litigation reached a settlement of the 
legal claims.223 
Moreover, it is quite likely that, due to the similarities between the successful 
causes of action in the StarLink™ litigation and Canadian Common Law causes of 
action, Canadian courts would reach a similar result.224  Due to practical reasons, the 
StarLink™ case will be introduced and discussed more precisely at a later stage of this 
thesis. 
In a second scenario, a claim could be brought to court for damages arising from 
an approved transgenic crop mixing with non-transgenic crops resulting in a loss of 
premium for a person or company who intended to sell a non-transgenic commodity or 
food product.  
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However, this second scenario related to labelling does not apply to North America 
since ‘requirements do not exist in the domestic markets of Canada and the United 
States because there are no laws requiring transgenic ingredients or foods to bear a 
“genetically modified” label’.225  Irrespective of labelling, the injured party should be 
able to scientifically demonstrate that there is a certain content of modified element in 
the output production of the crop, which will then stand in court regardless of the 
labelling issue. 
Additionally, claims could be possible for damages arising from an approved 
transgenic crop which is mixed with organic crops resulting in a loss of the organic label 
for the specific organic crop or an organic certification for the organic farmer’s farm 
products.226  In Canada, Saskatchewan organic farmers filed a class action lawsuit 
against transgenic seed developers, which is related to several other scenarios. 227  This 
case will also be discussed in more detail at a later stage of thesis.228  
In the fourth scenario, it is likely that the injured party makes claims for damages 
arising from the loss of market access.  This situation could occur out of market 
perceptions ‘when a buyer decides against buying a farmer’s crop even though there is 
no evidence of transgenic material or the evidence of transgenic material was below 
legally-set thresholds’.229 
Finally, a cause of action could be brought to court as a claim ‘for damages 
arising from a decision by a farmer to forgo planting a particular crop because of 
concern about proximity to transgenic crops or market perception about transgenic 
crops’.230 
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Scenario four and five are grouped together due to the fact that they share the following 
attributes: ‘lack of physical damage to the plaintiff’s property; the claims relate to 
disappointed commercial expectations; and the plaintiff and defendant are relational 
strangers who, therefore, have not allocated risks between themselves in a contractual 
relationship’.231  Furthermore, these scenarios apply to what is known in Canadian and 
American law as the ‘pure economic loss’ doctrine.232  The expansion of negligence 
law, prompted by Donoghue v Stevenson,233 has provided a broad protection of personal 
security and property interests.  It was not until the case of Hedley Byrne & Co. Ltd. v. 
Heller & Partners Ltd.,234 however, that the courts began to extend the tort of negligence 
to provide a remedy for pure economic loss.235  The word ‘pure’ is used in this context 
to exclude those situations where the economic loss is resultant upon damage to the 
person or property.236  This economic loss covers loss due to insecurity about the 
market’s demand for such crops, and the apprehension producers may have for wanting 
clear assurance of commercial viability of a crop before advancing into that venture. 
There are three reported cases in Canadian and American jurisprudence which 
represent these two scenarios.  The first one involves the already mentioned organic 
certification scenario of group three. 
b) Hoffman and Beaudoin v Monsanto Canada Inc and Bayer CropScience 
The case of Hoffman and Beaudoin v Monsanto Canada Inc and Bayer CropScience 
involves a group of Saskatchewan organic farmers bringing this action on behalf of all 
organic grain farmers in Saskatchewan in order to pursue class action litigation against 
both Monsanto Canada Inc. (Monsanto) and Bayer CropScience Inc (Bayer) which are 
‘both manufacturers and distributors of agricultural products including chemical 
fertilisers and pesticides’.237  The case concerns the plaintiff’s application for 
certification as a class, and so the decision addresses this issue ‘rather than the potential 
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liability claims resulting from the development and commercial introduction into 
Canada of genetically modified (“GM”) canola by the two defendants’.238 
In the late 1980s and early 1990s Monsanto and AgrEvo Canada, as the 
predecessors to Bayer, developed different varieties of canola known as ‘Roundup 
Ready Canola’ and ‘Liberty Link Canola’.239  In the ensuing time, both companies got 
the approval from the Agriculture and Agri-Food Canada (AAFC) for the release of the 
GM canola varieties into the environment.240  Due to their advantage ‘in permitting 
superior weed control (growing crops can be sprayed with Roundup or Liberty without 
damage to the crop), GM canola has now been embraced by conventional grain growers 
in Western Canada with the result that by 2003 approximately 70 per cent of all canola 
grown in Western Canada was either a Roundup Ready or Liberty Link variety’.241  
Hoffman and Beaudoin have brought forward three major complaints against the 
companies.  Firstly, the farmers argued that the release of GM canola has resulted in the 
impossibility ‘for farmers to guarantee that canola grown as ‘organic’ and does not 
contain traces of GM canola seed’.242  Following this, it shall no longer be possible to 
grow canola for the organic market under complying with the prohibitions on GMOs in 
the organic market.243  On 30 June 2009, the Organic Products Regulations (OPR) came 
into effect, making the new Canadian Organic Standards (COS) mandatory.244  The OPR 
will legally require organic products to be certified according to the COS if they are 
traded across provincial or international borders or use the Canada Organic Logo.245  
Secondly, it was argued that even farmers who are not attempting to grow canola suffer 
‘contamination of their fields by reason of the prevalence of Roundup Ready canola or 
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Liberty Link canola “volunteers” growing on their land.246  Another claim was brought 
forward with regards to the past and future cleanup costs resulting from this 
contamination.247 
The final complaint focused on the creation and abandonment of an identity 
preservation programme (IPP) by the defendants.248  The plaintiffs alleged that the 
abandonment of the programme, which had been implemented by the defendants when 
GM canola was first introduced on a commercial basis in 1995-96 to ensure the 
segregation of GM canola from conventional canola for the purposes of export, has 
resulted in the loss of the European market for all Canadian canola.249 
The three arguments against Monsanto and Bayer were broken down into four 
torts during the case: negligence, nuisance, trespass and the rule in Rylands v Fletcher. 
(1) Torts 
(a) Negligence 
With regards to the tort of negligence, the farmers alleged that two different duties of 
care have been breached by Monsanto and Bayer.  
Firstly, it was argued ‘that the defendant owed a duty to certified organic grain 
farmers to ensure that their GM canola would not infiltrate and contaminate farmland 
where it was not intended to be grown’250 ‘or at least the defendant ought to have 
warned growers purchasing their products of cross-pollination, and advised them of 
farming practices designed to limit the spread of the gene’.251  The plaintiff stated, 
furthermore, ‘that the defendant knew, or ought to have known, that the introduction of 
GM canola into the Saskatchewan environment’252 would result in GM canola 
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infiltrating and contaminating the environment, seed supplies and finally the property of 
certified organic grain growers.253  
Secondly, the plaintiff stated that due to the fact that ‘the export of GM canola 
was not regulated in Canada, the defendant undertook to develop their own export rules 
needed to assure continued access to foreign markets for Canadian canola in regard to 
the introduction of GM canola’.254  The plaintiff stated further that Monsanto and Bayer 
‘dropped their identity preserving programme (IPP), which was designed to ensure that 
no GM canola entered the Canadian export market’,255 when the approval for the Japan 
market was given.256  With regards to this, the plaintiff argued ‘that the defendant knew 
that the removal of the IPP would result in the eventual loss of the European market for 
Canadian canola’.257  As a consequence, it is stated ‘that the defendant, when 
undertaking the task of developing export rules to ensure continued access to foreign 
markets, owed a duty not to do so negligently and, in particular owed the plaintiff a duty 
to maintain an adequate IPP to preserve the European canola export market, where 
most of the Canadian organic produced canola was sold’.258  Therefore, the defendant 
shall be liable for the losses as particularised as particularized above.259  
In summary, the damage which arises from the breach of these alleged duties 
derives from disadvantages caused by: (1) loss of canola as a crop to be used within 
regular rotation; (2) loss of opportunity to participate in the certified organic canola 
market; (3) past and future cleanup costs caused by Roundup Ready or Liberty Link 
canola volunteers growing on the fields of organic farmers.  
The two already mentioned duties were addressed by the judge separately.  In 
this context, it has firstly been mentioned that the duty to ensure that GM canola would 
not infiltrate farmland was novel.  With regards to this circumstance, the judge turned to 
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the test of Anns v Merton London Borough Council260 to examine if this new duty of 
care should be recognised in the case.  
The judge stated insofar that ‘The Anns test is … said to be a two-pronged test.  
Firstly, one has to determine whether a prima facie duty of care arises; and secondly, 
whether there are any policy considerations that ought to reduce or limit the scope of the 
duty’.261   
The first part of the ‘Anns test is whether the pleadings allege reasonably 
foreseeable harm and relational proximity sufficient to establish a prima facie duty of 
care’.262  The judgment asserted that the farmers’ allegations where sufficient to 
conclude ‘that the adventitious presence of GM canola in fields and crops where it was 
not intended to be grown, including those of organic farmers, was foreseeable.’263  
However, the court was less certain with regards to the fact that the farmers’ claim 
supported the presumption that the loss and damage being claimed ‘(viz., loss of the use 
of canola as a marketable organic commodity and loss of canola for use in crop rotation, 
plus the clean-up costs and loss of use of fields as a result of GM canola volunteers) was 
foreseeable’.264  Concerning this matter, the judge pointed out that the organic standards 
in place at the time did not, for the most part, prohibit the use of GMOs in organic 
agriculture.265  Nonetheless, she assumed that the pleadings were sufficient to support 
this allegation, or that they could be easily amended to support the allegation.266  
Following this, the judge stated, while mentioning the case Cooper v. Hobart,267 that 
‘foreseeability of loss is not sufficient to establish a prima facie duty of care’.268  
Additionally, the judgment clarified that the plaintiff failed to allege whether there was 
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any relationship between themselves and the defendants.269  Following this argument, 
the plaintiff’s pleadings did not support the required relational proximity needed to 
establish a prima facie duty of care. 270 
In addition, the judge noticed that ‘there were policy considerations that, in 
accordance with the second leg of the test, would in her view, bar or limit the imposition 
of the duty of care’.271  The first policy consideration was the issue of government 
approval of the tentative release of the defendant’s varieties of GM canola.  Therefore, 
the court’s imposition of a duty of care not to release these substances into the 
environment appears ‘to be in conflict with express governmental policy’.272  Moreover, 
the judge described that ‘the bulk of the plaintiffs’ claim for loss of use of organic 
canola as a marketable crop, is a claim for pure economic loss of a category not 
previously recognised by Canadian courts’.273  It was concluded that, in effect, ‘the 
alleged damage is not of physical harm to the plaintiffs’ crops, but arises from the 
alleged inability to meet the requirements of organic certifiers or of foreign markets for 
organic canola’274 and ‘there is no allegation that GM canola is unhealthy or causes 
detrimental physical problems to humans or plant life’.275  On the basis of these facts, 
the judge held that there was no duty of care.276  Moreover, it was pointed out in this 
ruling that common law is generally ‘reluctant to find a duty of care to avoid causing 
foreseeable pure economic loss, largely for policy reasons.  By definition, such losses 
are not the direct result of the defendants’ action’.277 
Following this, ‘it has been argued that imposition of liability for causing pure 
economic loss risks exposing the defendant to indeterminate liability (“liability in an 
indeterminate amount for an indeterminate time to an indeterminate class”) and, in a 
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competitive commercial environment, may be “inconsistent with community standards 
in relation to what is ordinarily legitimate in the pursuit of personal advantage”’.278  
According to the court’s opinion, exceptions have been made ‘where the courts have 
found a special relationship, or proximity, such as the cases of negligent misstatement, 
where it can be shown that the defendant claimed special skill or knowledge and the 
plaintiff, to the defendant’s knowledge, relied on the statement or professional 
negligence’.279  
As already mentioned, the plaintiffs amended their statement of claim to include 
an alleged breach of an alleged duty of care not to negligently undertake the 
development of an identity preserving programme.  According to this amendment, the 
judge concluded that in order of such a duty the plaintiff had to rely in any way on the 
implementation of the IPP.280  However, following the judgment, the plaintiff failed to 
plead detrimental reliance.281  Accordingly, the claim does not give reasons to disclose a 
reasonable cause of action in negligence.282 
(b) Private nuisance 
With regards to private nuisance, the court distinguished ‘between activities or 
conditions that cause physical injury or damage to another’s land from activities and 
injuries that interfere with use or enjoyment of land, without actual physical damage’.283  
Furthermore, the court quoted an ‘authority for the proposition that no action can be 
brought by a plaintiff who is unduly reactive to the defendant’s conduct because he is 
carrying on a business or operation that is particularly sensitive to the kind of 
intervention that is in question’.284  Unfortunately, the judge failed to name the authority 
she was referring to.  However, the same issue of sensitivity of organic farming to GM 
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crop production was raised as a potential barrier to a claim in nuisance in the English 
case of R. v Secretary of State for the Environment ex parte Watson.285  
The defendants provided several counter arguments against the alleged cause of 
action in nuisance.  In the opinion of the defendants, it is questionable ‘(1) whether the 
harm claimed by the defendants (transfer of genetic material by pollen drift to the 
plaintiffs’ organic canola crops and the unwanted presence of volunteer canola plants 
on the plaintiffs’ organic fields) falls within the scope of the tort of nuisance, and (2) if 
so, whether the defendants are liable in nuisance for the harm alleged.’286 
With regards to the first point, the defendants claimed that the alleged damage 
was not caused by GM canola ‘but by the actions of third parties who have promulgated 
the standards affected by the inevitable adventitious presence of GM canola and by the 
decisions of individual organic farmers to seek to adhere to those standards’.287  Inherent 
in this argument is the claim that the adventitious presence of GM canola is not naturally 
harmful to crops or to land.288  In response to this, the defendants described cases which 
have imposed liability, for example, for the spread of weeds or for the drift of 
herbicides, both of which have harmed or endangered the physical wellbeing of growing 
crops.289  The second and related argument was that the injury or interference alleged is 
not sufficiently “unreasonable” or “substantial” to sustain a claim in nuisance.290   
The defendants pointed out that agricultural activity in the Saskatchewan region 
generally involved the production of open-pollinating crops.  They also drew attention 
to the fact that the release of GM canola was subject to federal approval and that the 
growing of GM canola is, according to the pleadings, widespread.291  Therefore, the 
release of GM canola should be a ‘usual and ordinary’ activity and pollen flow is a 
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natural phenomenon’.292  Furthermore, the activities of organic farmers are said to raise 
the issue of hypersensitivity, which is a consequence of their voluntary decision to grow 
organics.293  
With regards to this argumentation, the judge pointed out that ‘the plaintiffs’ 
allegation is in effect that the crops and land of organic farmers is effectively 
contaminated by the presence of GM canola’.294  In the judge’s opinion, ‘the analogy to 
contamination of land by weeds is too close to make it certain that the plaintiffs’ 
argument on this point cannot succeed’.295 
Furthermore, referring to the judgment, it can be argued ‘that just as weeds make 
it difficult or impossible to grow a conventional crop successfully, so too does 
contamination by GM canola make it impossible to grow organic crops’.296  The 
significance of the distinctions argued by the defendants is one which must be assessed 
by the trial judge on the whole of the evidence.297 
Moreover, Monsanto and Bayer argued that ‘they cannot be liable unless the 
alleged nuisance emanated from land they occupied or controlled’.298  The judge 
disagreed and pointed out that ‘anyone who actively creates a nuisance whether or not in 
occupation of the land from which it emanates can be liable and this liability continues 
so long as the offensive condition remains regardless of his ability to abate it and stop 
the harm’.299  Additionally, the court went on and characterised ‘the defendant’s true 
objection as being that no harm can be said to have been caused by the mere sale or 
marketing of GM canola’.300  
                                                 
292 Ibid. 
293 Ibid. 
294 Ibid at 108. 
295 Ibid at 108. 
296 Ibid at 108 
297 Ibid. 
298 Ibid at 112. 
299 Ibid at 113. 
300 Ibid at 114. 
U
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
- 42 - 
 
Moreover, the adventitious presence of non-organic canola in the crops and on the land 
of organic farmers should have required the intervention of neighbouring farmers who 
cultivated GM canola.301  The judge concluded that holding ‘the defendants liable in 
nuisance on the basis of the commercial marketing of the product would be equivalent to 
holding the manufacturers of pesticide responsible for the nuisance caused by the 
harmful drift of the pesticide.  While the “release” of the GM varieties of canola by the 
defendants may have been a necessary condition for the occurrence of the harm alleged, 
it was far from sufficient, in itself’.302 
Consequently, the judge pointed out that ‘the implications of holding a 
manufacturer, or even inventor, liable in nuisance for damage caused by the use of its 
product or invention by another would be very sweeping’.303  It was judged that ‘where 
the activity complained of is the activity of one who is not in occupation or control of 
adjoining land, and no independent malfeasance is alleged, then, at the very least, direct 
causation of the damage alleged must be alleged.’304  The court went on and stated that 
‘there are no facts alleged in this case that could support a finding that the defendants 
substantially caused the nuisance alleged’.305 
(c) Trespass 
The dispute centred on whether direct interference by the defendants was required for 
the action of trespass.  Concerning this matter, the plaintiff argued that directness should 
not be required where, as was alleged here, the spread of the genes to where they were 
not wanted was foreseeable.306  It is also argued that the GM gene in Roundup Ready 
and Liberty Link is the property of the defendants.  Therefore, it has been argued, the 
presence of the GM gene on land where it is not wanted is analogous to the “stray bull 
cases”307, which hold an owner strictly liable for damage caused by a bull which strays 
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onto a neighbour’s land.308  The justice disagreed in this matter and concluded that ‘the 
authority of a number of English and Canadian cases that require more direct 
interference, such as where Lord Denning denied that oil jettisoned by the defendant 
from a ship, carried by waves to the plaintiff’s shore, constituted trespass’.309  ‘The 
interferences in these cases were set in motion by the defendants, assisted only by 
natural and inevitable forces, and ought to have been treated as sufficiently direct to 
constitute a trespass.  If the results were unexpected, or could not reasonably have been 
foreseen, this would defeat the claim, not, however, because the injury was not direct, 
but because it was neither intentional nor negligent’.310  
Consequently, there is more needed than natural and inevitable forces between 
the marketing of GM canola and its spread to plaintiffs’ land.311  Furthermore, it was 
judged that the ‘stray bull’ cases are not trespass cases:312  
In the judge’s opinion, the imposition of strict liability for the consequences of 
stray bulls should clearly be a policy decision intended to place a heavy onus on the 
owners and possessors of bulls to keep these animals confined and under control.313  
Although the plaintiff argued ‘that the defendants “own” their GM canola gene - a 
claim that the defendants say is a misunderstanding of the nature of their interest under 
patent law - it can point to no similar public policy that would have, in effect, placed an 
onus on the defendants not to have commercially released GM canola.  For the 
plaintiffs’ claim is that once GM canola was commercially released, cross-pollination of 
conventional canola crops was natural and inevitable’.314 
In the judge’s conclusion, it was ruled that action in trespass for the adventitious 
presence of GM canola in the crops and on the lands of organic grain farmers did not lie 
against the defendants, as the inventors and marketers of GM canola, because even the 
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liberalised requirement for direct interference could not be met in the circumstances of 
the case.315  Therefore, the tort of trespass could not be upheld.316 
(d) The Rule in Rylands v Fletcher 
The court did not decide on whether or not GM canola was a dangerous substance or 
whether field trials of GM canola were an unnatural use of land.317 To a certain extent 
the judge pointed out that ‘it is not reasonably arguable that the commercial release and 
sale of Roundup Ready canola seed and Liberty Link canola seed constituted an 
“escape” of a substance, dangerous or otherwise, from property owned or controlled by 
the defendants in the sense of “escape” required by the rule in Rylands v. Fletcher.’318 
She concluded the plaintiff’s pleading does not constitute a cause of action under the 
rule of Rylands v Fletcher. 
(2) Summary 
The judgment stated that it was clear, as well as obvious, that the plaintiffs’ pleadings 
failed to disclose reasonable causes of action under the common law rules on 
negligence, strict liability under the rule of Rylands v. Fletcher, and trespass.  
Furthermore, it was judged that the pleading in nuisance was insufficient except for the 
possibility of linking it to statutory causes of action.  Therefore, it can be concluded that 
it is unlikely for a farmer to have promising liability claims considering the Hoffman 
and Beaudoin v Monsanto Canada Inc and Bayer CropScience judgment. 
c) Sample v. Monsanto Co.319 
In the case Sample v Monsanto Co the plaintiffs Frederick Sample and George Naylor 
brought a putative class action against the defendant Monsanto Co. (Monsanto), a 
developer and distributer of genetically modified corn and soybean seeds.320  The 
plaintiffs argued that farmers, such as themselves, who did not grow genetically 
modified crops, would lose revenue due to the fact that the European Community (EC) 
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rejects Monsanto's genetically modified products and, as a result, boycotts all American 
corn and soybean.321  Following this statement, the plaintiffs brought up claims for 
negligence as well as public nuisance against Monsanto with regards to the introduction 
of non-genetically modified seeds into the market.  Yet, the plaintiff had not suffered 
any injury to his person or his property due to the presence of genetically modified corn 
and soybeans on the market.322  
Monsanto moved for summary judgment, while arguing that the economic loss 
doctrine would block negligence and public nuisance claims which are not based on 
physical injury to persons or property.323  
Meanwhile, the plaintiffs argued that the economic loss doctrine was 
inapplicable as a result of the fact that some jurisdictions permit recovery solely of 
special damages, such as loss of income in public nuisance actions.324  The judges 
rejected this argument with the statement that neither Illinois nor Iowa would allow such 
cause of actions.325 
Furthermore, the plaintiffs stated that the economic loss doctrine ‘should not bar 
their negligence claims because there is no contractual or warranty relationship between 
Monsanto and the non-GM farmers’.326  In particular, the plaintiffs argued that because 
the parties missed the opportunity to determine the risk of loss through contractual 
means, the economic loss doctrine should be inapplicable.327  The judges also rejected 
this argument due to the reason that even if the economic loss doctrine is rooted in 
freedom of contract theory, the doctrine has ‘grown beyond its original 
freedom-of-contract based policy justifications’.328  In the court’s opinion, ‘farmers’ 
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expectations of what they will receive for their crops are just that, expectations’.329  
While any physical injury is absent, the plaintiffs cannot recover for drops in market 
prices.330 Finally, the court concluded that ‘because the economic loss doctrine applies 
to all tort claims…the plaintiffs’ claims fail as a matter of law’.331 
d) In re StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation332 
This case deals with the StarLink Corn Products Liability Litigation.  The defendant, 
Aventis CropScience USA Holdings, Inc. (Aventis), genetically engineered a corn seed 
to produce the protein Cry9C which is toxic to certain insects, and marketed the seed 
under the name ‘StarLink’.333  When Aventis applied to register the seed with the 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), pursuant to the agency's responsibilities under 
the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA),334 the EPA issued only 
a limited use registration due to the fact that ‘Cry9C had several attributes similar to 
known human allergens’.335  Consequently, the EPA determined that StarLink corn was 
not appropriate for human consumption.336  For this reason, the separation of StarLink 
corn from non-StarLink corn was an important process.337  To guarantee separation, the 
EPA ordered ‘segregation methods to prevent StarLink from commingling with other 
corn in cultivation, harvesting, handling, storage and transport, and a 660–foot “buffer 
zone” around StarLink corn crops to prevent cross-pollination with non-StarLink corn 
plants’.338  
StarLink corn was distributed throughout the United States from approximately 
May 1998 through to October 2000.339  Finally, ‘in October 2000, after numerous 
reports that human food products had tested positive for Cry9C, a wave of 
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manufacturers issued recalls for their corn products’.340  Shortly after this, the plaintiffs 
filed a law suit alleging that the contamination occurred as a result of the defendants 
failing to comply with the EPA's requirements.341 
The plaintiffs argued that ‘Aventis did not include the EPA-mandated label on 
some StarLink packages; did not notify, instruct and remind StarLink farmers of the 
restrictions on StarLink use, proper segregation methods and buffer zone requirements; 
and did not require StarLink farmers to sign the obligatory contracts’.342  Moreover, it 
was alleged that prior to the 2000 growing season, Aventis ‘instructed its seed 
representatives that it was unnecessary for them to advise StarLink farmers to segregate 
their StarLink crop or create buffer zones because Aventis believed the EPA would 
amend the registration to permit StarLink use for human consumption’.343  In summary, 
the plaintiffs brought claims for negligence, strict liability failure-to-warn, conversion, 
public nuisance, and private nuisance.344 This case will now be considered with regards 
to the same issues as the previous cases. 
(1) Nuisance 
The FIFRA prohibits enforcement of state laws that require additional packaging and 
labelling requirements, but does not prohibit state laws containing identical 
requirements.345  For instance, FIFRA allows states to create civil remedies for 
violations of the federal standard, but it does not allow states to add to or take away 
from the federal requirements.346 
For this reason, the court held that FIFRA did not pre-empt the plaintiffs' 
negligence claims per sé, and the court allowed the plaintiffs to proceed on their theory 
that the defendant’s ‘violated duties imposed by the limited registration’ and ‘made 
representations to StarLink growers that contradicted the EPA-approved label’.  They 
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also ‘failed to inform parties handling StarLink corn downstream of the EPA-approved 
warnings’.347  
The Economic Loss Doctrine permits parties to recover from physical injuries or 
injuries to property.  However, purely economic injuries are not compensated.  
Consequently, the defendants argued that the plaintiffs' damages were purely economic 
in nature and were, therefore, forbidden by the Economic Loss Doctrine.348  
Nevertheless, the Court held that to ‘the extent plaintiffs alleged that their crops were 
themselves contaminated, either by cross-pollination in the fields or by commingling 
later in the distribution chain, they had adequately stated a claim for harm to 
property.’349  
In the following, the defendants challenged three separate elements of the 
plaintiffs' negligence claim: duty of care, proximate cause, and an occurring damage.350  
In particular, the defendants argued that any effect StarLink may have had on corn 
markets was too far removed from defendants' conduct.351  Nonetheless, the Court 
pointed out that the defendants misunderstood summary judgment standards as well as 
procedure.352  The Court went on and stated that when a motion for summary judgment 
is filed, the Court ‘must not only accept plaintiffs' version, but also any set of facts 
consistent with it’.353  More precisely, the Court held that ‘Aventis had a duty to ensure 
that StarLink did not enter the human food supply, and their failure to do so caused 
plaintiffs' corn to be contaminated’.354 
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(2) Trespass to chattels 
The plaintiffs alleged ‘that the defendants' role in contaminating the corn supply 
amounted to a conversion of their property.’355  The Court rejected this statement due to 
the fact that the plaintiffs' corn was not destroyed and they were not deprived of 
possession.356  In the Court’s opinion, the plaintiffs' damages were only ‘a lower price, 
for which plaintiffs could be compensated without forcing a sale.’357  Additionally, the 
tort of trespass to conversion requires intention of the injuring party.358  The plaintiffs 
failed to prove that the defendants intended to cross-pollinate or physically mix StarLink 
corn with corn which was intended for human consumption.359  Out of this reason, the 
trespass of chattel claims was dismissed.360 
(3) Private Nuisance 
Finally, the Court addressed the nuisance claims.361  With regards to this claim, it was 
alleged that the defendants ‘created a private nuisance by distributing corn seeds with 
the Cry9C protein, knowing that they would cross-pollinate with neighbouring corn 
crops’.362  As a direct response, it was argued by the defendants that they could not ‘be 
liable for any nuisance caused by StarLink because they were no longer in control of the 
seeds once they were sold to farmers’.363  The Court pointed out that ‘residue from a 
product drifting across property lines presented a typical nuisance claim’, and all 
‘parties who substantially contribute to the nuisance are liable’.364  Moreover, it was 
stated that the defendants’ limited registration of the StarLink corn put them in a 
position to control the nuisance.365  Due to these reasons, the Court concluded that a 
valid claim for private nuisance was stated by the plaintiffs.366 
                                                 
355
 Ibid at 844. 
356
 Ibid. 
357
 Ibid. 
358
 Ibid. 
359
 Ibid. 
360
 Ibid. 
361
 Ibid at 844f. 
362
 Ibid at 844. 
363
 Ibid at 845. 
364
 Ibid at 847. 
365
 Ibid. 
366
 Ibid. 
Un
ive
rsi
y o
f C
ap
e T
ow
n
- 50 - 
 
e) Analysis 
This section will examine and discuss the arising liability concerns in the presented 
cases.  With regards to the pure economic loss doctrine, it can be stated, taking into 
account the ‘Hoffman case’ in Canada and the ‘Sample case’ and the ‘StarLink 
litigation’ in the United States, that it seems to be unlikely that claims for damages 
arising from the loss of market access, as well as claims for damages arising from a 
decision by a farmer to forgo planting a particular crop because of concern about 
proximity to transgenic crops or market perception about transgenic crops, are legally 
viable using Common Law causes of action in Canadian and American courts.   
Especially with regards to the Monsanto case, it can be stated that there is a 
broader issue underlying the action; one which has not been put directly in front of the 
court.   
In Canada, higher life forms are not patentable per sé, but in the case Monsanto 
Canada Inc. v Schmeiser the Canadian Supreme Court ruled in such an expressive 
manner regarding patents on modified genes and the cells that contain them, that the 
effective result of the decision was to extend patent rights to higher life forms.  
Following this decision, all burdens were shifted to the farmer.  It is farmers who must 
monitor their fields for volunteer GM canola plants or spread of the introduced field.  If 
and when the patented genes appear, it is the farmer who must call the company to come 
and remove the offending plants.  If farmers fail to monitor their fields or forget to call 
the company after noticing GM plants, they could face the threat of patent 
infringement.367 
In light of this movement, the presented ‘Hoffman case’ can be seen as an 
attempt to also place burdens on the companies, which have developed and released the 
GM varieties.  If a farmer were to be successful with a tortuous allegation, then the 
biotechnology companies could face liability costs for the consequences of their 
applicant technology.  If companies cannot be held responsible, then the ‘Hoffman 
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Case’ will build on the precedent set by Schmeiser and add yet another burden onto the 
list of those that the farmer must bear –the burden of damage.  Furthermore, where the 
courts to refuse a remedy for the unconsented genetic alteration of claimant’s produce as 
a result of cross-pollination from nearby GM crops, this could render the scope of 
property rights of organic farmers. These farmers may choose to farm organically, but 
his right to do what he wants on his own land would be affected adversely. 
B. Liability and compensation regimes: Germany 
This chapter will introduce and examine the German liability law with regards to 
scenarios where harm has been caused by the application of agricultural GMOs. 
1. German Law of Genetic engineering ‘Gentechnikgesetz’ (GenTG) 
a) Introduction 
As early as the 1970s, the German Department of Research and Technology provided 
guidelines in the field of new combined nucleic acid.368  According to these guidelines, 
permission had to be obtained in accordance with the German Immission Protection Act 
369(BImSchG) for the usage of GMOs in research and development.370  
Besides the BimSchG, other acts like the Act of Chemicals,371 the Plant 
Protection Act372 and the Act of Drugs373 focused on the same juristic issue.  The 
splattering settlement in the field of GM related liability law was publicly criticised in 
the ensuing time.374  Therefore, an extensive GM liability was demanded.375  In 1993, 
for German law to conform to European Community laws,376 Germany passed the 
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GenTG.377  The German Law of Genetic Engineering came in force in 1990 and finally 
settled the problem of law splattering.378  The GenTG was revised in 1993379 in order to 
adapt recent developments in the field of GM engineering to current law.380  
Furthermore, the revised version provided the Transformation Act of the EC 
directive.381  A revised version of the GenTG came into force in 2002 and contained 
measures with regards to the work in GM engineering facilities.382  The main concern of 
the revised version of the GenTG in 2004 was to protect the conventional and organic 
farmers from chip out, incorporation of GMOs and, consequently, to advance the 
coexistence of both farming methods.383  As a response to more recent European Union 
laws384 relating to agricultural biotechnology, Germany amended its GenTG by adding 
new provisions regarding legal liability,385 which are of special relevance for this 
dissertation.  Shortly after the publication of the German government’s draft of the main 
points of the concepts in the field of GM application,386 the fourth revised GenTG law 
came into force in 2008, which is presently the applicable law. 
b) Goals of the GenTG as amended and revised in 2008 
The GenTG mainly contained changes in the research area with the alleviation of the 
admission procedure.387  Following this alleviation, only an announcement is required 
for the work with GM material onto the lowest security level instead of an application 
procedure.388  By examining the GenTG of 2008, it can be concluded that the act 
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generally tries to protect the environment, animals, plants and property from the adverse 
impact of GM developments and products.  This is in accordance with § 1 GenTG which 
contains provisions for the protection of ethical values and the health of human life.  
Furthermore, the GenTG tries to achieve precaution with regards to these dangers 
according to § 1 Number 1 GenTG and to provide that GM products can be introduced 
into the market according to § 1 Number 2 GenTG.  Finally, the GenTG tries to 
stimulate the research and development of the GM engineering according to 
§ 1 Number 3 GenTG.  
c) General Scope of the GenTG 
The scope of the GenTG covers GM engineering plants, GM research as well as the 
release and market introduction of GMOs.  A GMO is defined according to 
§ 3 Number 3 GenTG as an organism which is, due to its technical creation, unique in 
the environment.  § 6 GenTG imposes general duty of care with regards to GMO 
handling.  According to § 7 GenTG, GMO development and production in GM 
engineering plants are classified into four different safety zones.  The governmental 
approval requirement of GM engineering plants is regulated by § 8 GenTG.  For that 
reason, an approval for the release and introduction of GMOs is also required for the 
manufacturer in accordance with § 14 I 1 GenTG.  Additionally, the administration has 
to provide specific information to the public in cases where potential risks arise due to 
the application of GMOs.389   
As a contradiction to the European GMO law,390 the GenTG also regulates civil 
liability issues in the field of GMOs which will be discussed and examined hereafter. 
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d) ‘Genetic causation’ as an interface 
A basic requirement for the applicability of the GenTG is the ‘genetic causation’ 
between the alleged damage and the presence of a GMO.391  The decisive test in 
applying the GenTG is thereby the traditional ‘conditio sine qua non’ formula, which is 
not tempered by the exclusion of particularly unlikely events.392  In a similar vein, 
research and development risks are not excluded from the ambit of § 32 GenTG.393 
While claimants bringing a case on the basis of the GenTG will have to prove, 
usually with the help of experts’ opinions and testing, the existence of damage and 
causation through GM crops, it will be presumed that such damage was specifically 
caused by its modified characteristics.394  This limited presumption of causation is 
refutable if it can be proven that the damage in question was caused by the unmodified 
genes particular to that GMO.395  The GenTG, therefore, provides only a limited degree 
of protection from the typical difficulties of proving causation in such cases.  
Some assistance, however, is given by § 35 GenTG.396  This provision requires 
the operator of a facility in which the GMOs are developed, tested, produced or 
otherwise handled to provide information concerning the technical process, including 
tests on open land, so that victims can better ascertain whether claims based on the 
GenTG actually exist.397  In the case of a test on open land, detailed information should 
also be available from the authority which issued the required permit as such tests must 
be publicly registered.398  This register must reveal the exact location and size of the 
fields.399  Moreover, additional information has to be disclosed to anyone with a 
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legitimate interest, such as potential injured parties who can show that their property 
was subject to interference by GMOs.400  
As already indicated, there is no reversed burden of proof beyond the scope of 
§ 34 GenTG.  Different sources of adventitious presence of GMOs are taken into 
account within the normal rules of evidence.  Thereby, ‘prima facie’ evidence will often 
help the injured party.  If a particular GM crop is thus developed, tested, produced or 
otherwise handled in a certain area, and neighbourhood fields are subsequently 
contaminated with GMOs of this kind, it will be extremely difficult for the operator of 
the facility in question to assume the typical course of events and simultaneously avoid 
liability on the basis of § 32 I GenTG.  Specific proof of a different cause may be 
presented to counter the assumption,401 but will only be available in rare cases as claims 
based on the GenTG involve, by definition, only contamination by GMOs which have 
thus far seen little or no circulation.  The specific genetic profile of these GMOs will 
hardly leave room for alternative causes. 
The GenTG, as far as it establishes strict liability, does not include special rules 
on alternative, potential or uncertain causation.402  In these cases, the general rules of the 
BGB apply.403  According to § 830 I Sentence 2 BGB and § 287 of the German Code of 
Civil Procedure (ZPO),404 several possible injuring parties will be jointly and separately 
held responsible for the interference in cases where identification of one injuring party 
from others is not possible.405  However, each party has the right to prove that their 
respective contributions were in fact limited and particular shares can be apportioned.406   
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The same principle is applied in cases where several injuring parties can be safely 
identified as having caused the damage, but it remains uncertain as to what extent one or 
the other is actually responsible.407  
Other than these alternative cases, potential or uncertain causation, and joint and 
several liability is also expressly established by § 32 II GenTG if the same damage is 
caused by more than one injurer.408  The internal distribution of costs will depend on 
their respective shares of responsibility.  § 32 II sentence 2 GenTG and recourse is 
possible on the basis of § 426 II BGB if one of the responsible parties comes up with the 
full amount.409  Moreover, § 32 III GenTG clarifies that the German Civil Code 
§ 254 BGB410 applies if the party suffering the damage contributed to the occurrence of 
the damage.  
Finally, it can be concluded that only in a case where the ‘genetic causation’ is 
established, can the regulations of GenTG be applicable.  Therefore, the ‘genetic 
causation’ can be seen as an interface between the general liability law and the specific 
liability law in terms of the GenTG. 
e) Scope of civil liability within the GenTG: Overview 
§ 32 I GenTG imposes civil liability upon ‘operators’ for the death, injury, impairment 
of health, or property damage of other persons resulting from the properties of a GMO.  
The term ‘operator’ is specified by § 3 VII GenTG as artificial or natural persons who 
establish a genetic engineering installation, perform genetic engineering operations, or 
release or place genetically modified organisms on the market without authorisation 
under the GenTG.  In addition, the damage for which liability exists is, according to 
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§ 32 I, VII GenTG, direct, physical damage to the life, health, or property (including 
nature and landscape) of another person.411 
Finally, even when an operator is found liable according to § 32 GenTG, 
§ 33 GenTG regulates an exposure cap of 85 Million Euro for this liability claim.412  
This exposure cap is conducted by the legislative assumption, according to 
§ 34 GenTG, that if the damage was caused by a GMO, it was caused by the genetically 
modified features of the organism.413  However, this assumption is overturned if it is 
shown probable that the damage was caused by other (non-modified) features of the 
GMO.414  Due to the statute assumption, the liability under the GenTG is strict.   
f) Civil Liability in cases of GMO chipping out under the GenTG  
As mentioned previously, there is a serious legal issue arising from of the chipping out 
of GM plants.  Damage which results from chipping out is generally regulated, in 
German law, by the field of law concerning the respective interests of neighbours.415  
With regards to this legal issue, § 36a I GenTG provides that civil liability attaches to 
any person growing GM crops when the characteristics of the transgenic crop transfer to 
other farm products or when the introduction of transgenic crops impacts other farm 
products.  The acts of transfer or introduction in these cases are statutorily determined to 
represent a significant damage inside the meaning of § 906 BGB.  
§ 36 a II GenTG provides that significant damnification exists particularly if another 
farm product cannot be placed on the market;416 another farm product can only be 
placed on the market with a label indicating that it is genetically modified,417 and if 
another farm product cannot be placed on the market with a label legally applicable to 
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the production method used to produce that farm product.418  The civil liability standard 
of § 36a I GenTG is, firstly, strengthened by the already mentioned and applicable cause 
assumption of § 34 GenTG.  Secondly, § 36a IV GenTG establishes joint and several 
liability for those neighbours of the person who is claiming damages.  If several 
neighbours could be considered the cause of the significant impairment and if the person 
claiming damages from the transfer or other introduction of transgenic characteristics 
finds it impossible to establish which of the neighbours caused the impairment, then all 
neighbours who grow GM crops have to bear the liability according to § 36a I GenTG.  
However, according to § 36a IV GenTG, the neighbours can avoid joint and several 
liability titles when one neighbour or all can establish who caused what portion of the 
significant impairment so that the court can properly allocate damages to individual. 
Finally, according to § 33 GenTG, cap of damage does not apply to liability 
under § 36a GenTG.  Due to its statutory language, § 33 GenTG only applies to the 
liability claim under § 32 GenTG. 
In summary, the consequence of these three strengthened statutes is that a person 
can argue minimal facts, which supports the damage claim under § 36a I GenTG 
liability against several neighbouring farmers growing GM crops and win the lawsuit 
based on the presumptions created by §§ 34 and 36a IV GenTG for uncapped damages.   
The contrast between the civil liability under § 32 GenTG and § 36a GenTG is 
remarkably important.  On the one hand, § 32 GenTG generates liability for operators as 
already mentioned.  On the other hand, § 36a GenTG obviously applies to operators as 
well as transgenic farmers.  Furthermore, § 36a GenTG decisively focuses on transgenic 
farmers as being subject to civil liability and explicitly allows farmer versus farmer 
lawsuits.419  Additionally, § 36a GenTG generates assertive liability titles for authorised 
GM crops (explicitly GM crops which are fully approved for market introduction) while 
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§ 32 GenTG liability only applies for those transgenic organisms which are not 
authorised for market access.  § 36a II highlights liability for authorised transgenic crops 
by imposing the obligation of compliance with good agricultural practices, as specified 
in § 16 b II, III GenTG.  However, the allegation to be compliant with good farming 
practices is not a successful plea to impose civil liability under § 36a GenTG. 
The practical function of the GenTG in cases of agricultural GMO liability will 
be explained by applying it to the five possible scenarios previously discussed under 
Canadian and US law.  Due to the lack of any agricultural GMO related case in 
Germany, these scenarios cannot be presented in this section.   
(1) Scenario one: Unapproved transgenic crop mixing with commercial 
agricultural crops 
In the first scenario, a claim could be brought to court for damages arising out of an 
unapproved transgenic crop mixing with commercial agricultural crops. 
Due to its wording, § 36a I Number 1 GenTG explicitly imposes civil liability 
when transgenic crop products, which are not authorised for introduction onto market, 
commingle with a neighbour’s commercial crops.  Concerning § 36a GenTG, the 
presence of any unauthorised-for-full-commercial-release transgenic crop product in a 
commercial crop results in civil liability for economic damage because the commercial 
crop must be withheld or recalled from the market.  
(2) Scenario two: Approved transgenic crops mixing with non-transgenic crops 
(loss of premium) 
Furthermore, it seems possible that damage arises from an approved transgenic crop 
which is mixing with non-transgenic crops resulting in a loss of premium for a person 
who intended to sell a non-transgenic commodity or food product.  With regards to this 
scenario,§ 36a II number 2 GenTG clearly imposes civil liability if, ‘according to the 
provisions of the present Act or according to other acts’,420 the non-GM farmer’s 
products may only be placed on the market with a label indicating the genetic 
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modification.421  In the light of the statutory language of § 36a I number 2 GenTG, the 
German law unmistakably establishes civil liability claims for the economic loss of a 
premium when the person who lost the premium intended to produce a non-transgenic 
crop.  Accordingly, if a non-transgenic crop farmer produced a crop that had to be 
labelled under community law422 because it had above 0.9 per cent adventitious 
presence of GM content, the non-GM farmer would have a civil liability claim against 
neighbouring transgenic farmers. 
(3) Scenario three: Approved transgenic crops mixing with organic crops (loss of 
organic label) 
Moreover, claims are imaginable for damages arising from an approved transgenic crop 
which mixes with organic crops resulting in a loss of the organic label for the specific 
organic crop or of organic certification for the organic farmer’s farm.  § 36a I number 3 
GenTG clearly initiates civil liability adverse to GM farmers if an organic or 
conventional farmer is not able to place a crop on the market with an organic label 
which would have otherwise been possible according to the respective regulations 
legally applicable for the production method.  
If § 36a I number 3 of GenTG’s language, ‘the respective regulations legally 
applicable’, referred exclusively to European Community law about organic production, 
German GM farmers should have little concern about civil liability.  EC organic 
regulations prohibit the use of transgenic seeds or transgenic materials due to the fact 
that the regulations focus on production standards.423 
However, the European Commission (“EC”) organic regulations do not set an 
exact minimum level for the adventitious presence of GM material in crops.424  
Although not without dispute about the correct legal interpretation of the organic 
regulations, the EC has advised that organic farmers do not lose the organic label for 
products unless the farmer intentionally uses transgenic seeds or materials or unless the 
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product is above the 0.9 per cent labelling requirement generally applicable to 
agricultural products.425  The EC has given this interpretation, due to the absence of a 
specific threshold for GM content being set forth in the organic policy, the general 
boundary value applies.426  
Nevertheless, the language of § 36a I number 3 GenTG, ‘the respective 
regulations legally applicable’, is a clear reference to the German Regulation of 
Ecological Labeling (ÖkoKennzV) which authorises, but does not require, organic 
producers to voluntarily label their products with ‘without genetic engineering’.427  As a 
result of European law-making in 2008, a new minimum standard for Organic labelling 
was set in the EC member states.428  With the direct effect of the EC Regulation No. 
1829/2003 and EC Regulation No. 834/2007 EC, 0.9 per cent as the maximum amount 
of transgenic material is allowed before a German organic farmer loses the voluntary 
organic ‘without genetic engineering’ label.429 
Consequently, section § 36a I number 3 GenTG also imposes civil liability upon 
GM farmers for standards and labels adopted by the European Community.  
According to § 36a I number 3 GenTG, GM farmers in Germany have acquired 
the legal obligation to ensure that organic farmers meet organic standards and labels that 
were introduced recently. 
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(4) Scenario four: Damages arising from the loss of market access 
Claims for damages could arise from the loss of market access in cases where a buyer 
decides against buying a farmer’s crop even though there is no proof of transgenic 
material or the evidence of GM material was below lawfully set boundary value.  
With regards to this scenario, § 36a I number 1-3 GenTG does not fit in this 
case.  Therefore, it is important to have a closer look into the statutory language of § 36a 
I GenTG.  The word ‘insbesondere’ (translated ‘in particular’) generally broadens the 
application of this paragraph.430  Furthermore, the specific legislative purpose of the 
phrase ‘in particular’ is to extend the conditions triggering liability to other types of 
interference which qualify as essential from the organic farmer’s perspective.431  This 
assumption is possible due to the amendments of the GenTG in 2004 which added the 
wording ‘giving regard to ethical values’ to § 1 number 1 GenTG.  This amendment 
opened the door for possible claims based on ethical values, in cases of impairment of 
usage, for which § 36a GenTG establishes civil liability.432  Such a significant ethical 
value could be seen in the violation of natural organisms or by tampering with nature by 
mixing genes among species. 
Moreover, this modification of the initial wording injects a high dose of legal 
uncertainty into the liability regime.  As a consequence, liability risks appear 
incalculable and unpredictable and also unpreventable unless one ensures that one’s 
neighbours all farm non-GM.  Consequently, it seems as possible that German courts 
may examine the words ‘in particular’ as demonstrated to impose civil liability upon 
GM farmers in cases of damage due to lost market access for organic or conventional 
famers.  This is noteworthy due to the reason that the German civil law is generally 
based ‘on the principle that the person entitled to a legal interest is the person to sue for 
damage to it.  If the interest in question is the most general of all, namely economic 
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well-being, some special reason is required for transferring the loss to someone else.’433  
This axiom is deduced from the fact that § 252 BGB, as a rule of the general civil law 
for economic loss, is only applicable within a contractual relationship.  Furthermore, an 
examination of § 823 I BGB shows that economic loss is also not covered under general 
tort law due to the fact that it is not a part of property.  Therefore, it can be concluded 
that ‘primary economic loss calls for a special relationship of the party causing the 
harm to the economic interest infringed.  This is met in cases of contract and some 
special torts.  In other cases, however, negative economic effects are part of the risks of 
life which the person has to bear.’434  Under deviance from a general juristic principle 
within the German civil law, § 36a GenTG specifically creates claims in cases of 
impairment of usage – protections for impairments arising from consumer perception, 
market perception, and ethical values – so as to give a statutory basis in German law for 
a greatly expanded recovery for pure economic loss.  § 36a GenTG singles out GM 
agriculture to create specific torts for which GM operators, as well as farmers, would be 
held liable and for which pure economic loss would be recoverable. 
(5) Scenario five: Farmer resigns to plant a specific crop 
Finally, this section examines how § 36a GenTG deals with claims for damages arising 
from a decision by a farmer to resign to use a particular crop because of concern about 
proximity to transgenic crops or market perception about transgenic crops.  This 
scenario regarding pure economic loss damage, is similar to the discussed scenario four. 
Therefore, the already presented explanations under scenario four can be referred to.  
Consequently, § 36a I GenTG also imposes liability for the pure economic loss under 
the situation of scenario four as opposed to general German civil liability rules.  
g) Summary 
In cases where an unapproved transgenic crop is commingling with commercial 
agricultural crops, it was shown that the German GenTG imposes liability under 
§ 36a I Number 1 GenTG.  The German GenTG also imposes liability, according to § 
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36a II Number 2 GenTG, in cases when an approved transgenic crop mixing with non-
transgenic crops causes a loss of premium with regards to the 0.9 per cent rule within 
the EC.  Furthermore, the case was examined when an approved transgenic crop mixing 
with organic crops causes loss of organic label.  
It has been illustrated that the GenTG offers a promising liability claim under 
§ 36a I Number 3, since ‘Ecological Labeling’ was introduced.  Moving forward with 
regards to possible damages arising from the loss of market access, it can be stated that 
due to its open statutory language, the GenTG can cover these kinds of damages.  Due to 
this open statutory language, it is not surprising that the law also offers a promising 
claim in cases where a farmer resigns to plant a special crop due to his personal 
concerns.  
In summary, it can be stated that the German GenTG provides an ultimate cover 
for all examined damage scenarios in this dissertation. 
h) Comparison to North American Liability Law 
In this section, a comparison will demonstrate the similarities and differences between 
the North American and the German Genetic Liability law.  
With regards to scenario one, the analysis has shown that 
§ 36a I Number 1 GenTG evidently creates civil liability in the same circumstances as 
existed in the United States in the StarLink™ litigation.435  However, § 36a I number 1 
GenTG also places emphasis on a broader civil liability standard beyond the StarLink™ 
litigation.  
On the one hand, § 36a I number 1 GenTG focuses on authorised field trials as 
the most likely fact pattern to which § 36a I number 1 GenTG applies.  On the other 
hand, the StarLink™ litigation did not involve any field trials, but involved the 
intermingling of a GM crop, which was approved for commercial release only for 
animal feed, with the food supply.436  Moreover, the StarLink™ litigation issued no 
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ruling about civil liability arising from properly authorised and properly conducted field 
trials.437  § 36a I number 1 GenTG, in contrast, imposes civil liability on any mixing 
from a field trial with a commercial agricultural crop even if the operator conducting the 
field trial has fully complied with required field trial protocols.438 
Referring back to scenario two, it is most likely that § 36a I number 2 GenTG 
will lead to numerous law suits.439  On the contrary, the Canadian and US law does not 
offer, due to the absence of any GM labelling rules, promising liability claims in cases 
of loss of premium.440  Therefore, it can be stated that the liability systems are 
completely different with regards to scenario two.  
In the third scenario, how the liability systems deal with a case of loss of organic 
labels for farmers was examined.  It was shown that the introducing of an official 
organic label in 2008 under European Community lead liability expansion according to 
§ 36a I number 3 GenTG.441  The Hoffman and Beaudoin v Monsanto Canada Inc and 
Bayer CropScience case study has demonstrated that promising liability claims are only 
possible with regards to the tort of nuisance.  Due to the already mentioned insufficient 
pleading, it seems difficult to justify such a claim under common law.  Therefore, it can 
be concluded that liability under German GenTG law is much broader and promising 
than the liability rules according to Canadian or US law. 
Furthermore, it was examined that § 36a GenTG imposes liability for pure 
economic loss in the situation of scenario four and five.  On the contrary, it was pointed 
out that, taking into account the Canadian ‘Hoffman case ‘and ‘Sample case’ as well as 
the US ‘StarLink litigation’, it seems as unlikely that claims for damages arising from 
the loss of market access, as well as claims for damages arising from a decision by a 
farmer to forgo planting a particular crop, are promising in these jurisdictions.  
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Therefore, the German jurisprudence is much broader than the North American civil 
liability.  More significantly, in light of the broad imposition of civil liability under 
section § 36a I GenTG, the German liability dispensed to require any allegation of 
physical harm or inability to market a particular crop.  Therefore, the German liability 
rejected the important limitation in the form of the pure economic loss doctrine under 
Canadian and American tort law.  Due to the fact that the majority of European 
consumers, including Germans, regard gene technology in agriculture and food products 
with some skepticism, it seems that consumer protections have been the leading reason 
for the German legislature to step aside from such a limitation.442 
Hence, it can be alleged that in the practice of singling out GM agriculture for 
special torts, German law presents a stark contrast to the North American jurisprudence 
about civil liability for GM crops.   
2. General Liability under § 823 I BGB 
a) Introduction 
Farmers raising crops from GM seed which has been authorised/licensed for general 
circulation will be subject to the rules of the BGB and, more specifically, to the 
provisions protecting property interest according to § 823 ff. BGB. 443  The analysis of 
§ 823 I BGB probably represents the most conceivable provision among the general 
liability system.  A detailed analysis of all conceivable bases of claims, however, is 
beyond the scope of this thesis.  
b) Objects of legal protection under § 823 I BGB 
The liability, according to § 823 I BGB, is limited to specific subjective and objective 
legal rights such as property and health.444  As already pointed out, health and property 
protecting interests are one of the most important concerns in the field of agricultural 
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GMO liability.445  With regards to these issues, it can be stated that § 823 I BGB is 
protecting health as well as property due to its clear statutory.  Yet, ecological damages 
are not covered by § 823 BGB due to the reason that environment rights are not 
associated with one right holder.  The German Law of Delict protects only individual 
rights.446  
c) Duty of Care 
With regards to the protection of legal objects under § 823 I BGB, the harm of duties of 
care ‘Verkehrspflicht’ seems to be suitable.  With regards to § 823 BGB, the judges 
developed the rule that the person who creates a danger for other people is obligated to 
undertake appropriate measures to avoid the occurring damage.447  The duties of care 
protect the entity with regards to the objects of legal protections under § 823 I BGB in 
respect of every active harming or harming by omission. Apart from the GenTG certain 
duty of cares may arise with regards to every GM working, market and field 
introduction.448 This scenario is regulated by § 823 I BGB.  As a consequence, 
researchers and GM farmers have the duty of care to comply with the rules set out by 
the GenTG.449  This is where the standard of care established by the § 16b GenTG needs 
to be taken into consideration.  A GM farmer has to comply with the comprehensive 
safety measures designed to prevent contamination of neighbouring crops and farmland.  
Consequently, a GM farmer will be obliged to compensate equitably, but as long as he 
can show compliance with the good professional practice (gute fachliche Praxis), as 
defined in § 16 b GenTG, the farmer is safe from claims out of § 823 I BGB.  The 
general rules will apply insofar as the standards established by the GenTG were not met 
due to the breach of duty of care. 
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d) Fault 
An essential requirement of § 823 BGB, is a fault-based harming.450  Consequently, if 
there is no fault; there is no promising claim.  In any case, the injuring party may prove 
to be compliant the duty of cares set by the GenTG.  This is the objective requirement of 
duty of care according to § 276 I sentence 2 BGB.  In cases where this requirement is 
fulfilled, it means the injuring party successfully proved to be compliant with the 
existing duty of care and the success of a claim is not likely.  
However, in cases where an operator or a GM farmer breached the duty of care, 
it has to be further assessed whether or not it was possible for the injuring party to 
foresee the need of precautionary measures due to duty of care.  If this assessment 
results in the conclusion that it had, indeed, been possible to foresee that precautionary 
measures were required, the caused harm was fault based, according to § 823 I BGB. 
e) Causation 
The causation requirement was previously introduced in chapter IV, with regards to the 
GenTG.  Therefore, this section can be referred to, due to the similarity of the causation 
requirement to the liability provisions under the GenTG.451 
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f) Civil Liability in cases of the chipping out of genes under § 823 I BGB 
(1) Scenario one: Unapproved transgenic crops mixing with commercial 
agricultural crops 
Under § 823 I BGB, only damages that are connected with an individual right are 
covered.  
Scenario one could be seen as an economic damage due to the fact that it is no 
longer possible to sell the crops on the market.  Economical damages, however, are not 
covered under § 823 I BGB.  Therefore, this exclusion could be used as an argument in 
support of the idea that the damage alleged in scenario one is not claimable under § 823 
I BGB.   
The German highest civil court (Bundesgerichtshof) has ruled, in the past, that 
the legal property right as an individual has to be widened.  
In the famous ‘Kondensator Judgement’ of 1993, the court had left it open as to 
whether the connection of an exact part with a defective part could constitute property 
damage for the whole object when either the object was not destroyed or the exact part 
was damaged.452  In the ‘Transistor Case’ in 1998, the Bundesgerichtshof assumed 
property damage with regards to the initially exact parts of a transistor which had later 
been assembled with defective supply units and as result led to a loss of value.453  
Due to the specific characteristics of a GMO, it seems as possible that 
assembling according to § 947 BGB, commingling according to § 948 BGB and 
processing according to § 950 BGB will lead to property damage if one applies the 
transistor case rule.  In this regard, it is conceivable that, for example, a case could occur 
where defective plasmids have been put into an organism and multiplied.  Storing them 
with other goods could then lead to a loss of value of the newly created unit.  In cases 
where GM crops are mixed with commercial, agricultural crops which are meant for the 
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market, this leads to property damage according to § 823 I BGB under the Transistor 
judgment.  
(2) Scenario two: Approved transgenic crops mixing with non-transgenic crops 
(loss of premium) 
The loss of premium in cases of GM crops mixing is also characterised as a case of 
economical damage.  Therefore, compensation is also conceivable as a property damage 
under the transistor judgment as already mentioned in scenario one. 
(3) Scenario three: Approved transgenic crops mixing with organic crops (loss of 
organic label) 
In scenario three, the loss of an organic label also leads to the unassailability of the 
contaminated organic crops.  However, the loss of the ‘organic label’ is neither a direct 
property damage nor connected to the transistor case.  Therefore, it is not possible to 
have a promising claim for scenario three under § 823 I BGB. 
(4) Scenario four and five: Damages arising from the loss of market access/ 
Farmer resigns to plant a specific crop 
In another ruling, the German ´Bundesgerichtshof´ pointed out that physical harm is not 
required to constitute a property damage under § 823 I BGB.454  Therefore, property 
damage should exist in cases where an organic field is invaded by GM seed which leads 
to the genetic altering of other non-GM plants.  Cases of loss of market access and 
farmers’ personal decisions are too imprecise to fit into either the property definition or 
the transistor case exception.  Therefore, a liability claim is not possible under 
§ 823 I BGB in cases of scenario four and five. 
g) Comparison to North American Liability Law 
With regards to scenario one, the examination has pointed out that § 823 I BGB 
obviously imposes civil liability in cases of commingling.  However, the claim is 
narrowed by the standard of care established by § 16b GenTG.  Therefore, it can be 
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stated that the general liability claim under the BGB is also limited as under the US 
StarLink™ litigation.455  
With regards to the second scenario, it can be stated that the standard of duty of 
care somehow serves as a liability constraint.  However, such a scenario is not 
conceivable in the USA and Canada due to the absence of any governmental labelling 
system.  
The third scenario revealed that the special ruling in the transistor case only 
applies to liability claims which are not too broad.  Due to the inapplicability of § 823 I 
BGB in cases of loss of organic labels, the German general liability provision is much 
narrower than the US and Canadian causes of action which offer at least hardly 
attainable nuisance claims. 
Due to the lack of a liability claim under § 823 I BGB, in cases of scenario four 
and five, the German liability rule achieves the same result as the US and Canadian 
courts considering the ‘pure economic loss’ doctrine. 
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V. Conclusion 
 
This thesis has demonstrated the difficulties surrounding the issue of GMO-caused 
liability claims.  The application of GMOs in agriculture has several potential 
implications for environmental, social and economic interest.  Generally speaking, these 
potential implications provide a good illustration of the principles of sustainable 
development law.456  More specifically, the three examined cases have demonstrated the 
need to balance the principle of integration and inter-relation of social, economic and 
environmental objectives in order to find a satisfying solution.  
Traditional farming practices, and the seeds that farmers plant, have evolved 
over a long period of time.  The introduction and rapid spread of GM canola and their 
introduced genes have already brought significant changes to North American fields in 
the thirteen years they have been in use.  Moreover, changes of farming practice are 
more than likely in Europe in the next decade.  Furthermore, it can be stated that GM 
crops create new problems such as unforeseen gene transfer possibilities or labelling 
requirements which are not found in the conventional farming sector.  Therefore, it can 
be concluded that a strong liability regime will be of utmost importance in the future.  It 
can be alleged that GM crops will have continuous application throughout the world due 
to reasons of food shortage and profit maximisation.  Consequently, the special role of 
these crops has to be taken into consideration in any liability regime.  For organic 
farmers to successfully defend their claims in court, much has to change.  GM crops 
raise new problems for current legal systems which are not taking their lead from 
conventional technology.  
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With regards to North America, it can be noted that under current law, the interests of 
organic and conventional farmers are largely unrecognised; whereas in Germany, the 
GenTG has led to an unjustified widening of liability for operators and potential GM 
farmers. 
By taking into account the outcome of the analysed cases, a fault based liability 
regime might not provide the best solution since the requirement of fault places an 
evidential burden on the plaintiff to show that a defendant breached a duty of care that 
was owed to the plaintiff.  Due to the limited risk assessment in the field of GMOs, such 
a burden may hinder the ability to efficiently compensate victims.  Furthermore, most of 
the information about the facts is in the hands of the plaintiffs, which leads to huge 
practical proof problems for the defendant.  
Consequently, it is not surprising that neither the North American regime nor the 
German liability law recognises a promising fault-based liability claim within their 
jurisdiction.  
For that reason, a strict liability regime might provide a more promising solution.  
The presentation of the aims of tort law has shown that such a regime should balance the 
affected interests.  This balance could be achieved under avoidance of a fault-based 
regime with the application of a strict liability law.  
However, the examination of the common law system in North America has 
shown that the strict liability rule in Rylands v Fletcher is not capable of adequately 
covering agricultural GMO liability cases.  The German statutory liability regime 
approach with the introduction of the GenTG seems to be more appropriate due to the 
fact that the German government recognised the unique character of GM technology in 
comparison with conventional farming.  As a result of this adaptation, development 
liability claims seem to be more promising.  However, with regards to the rule of strict 
liability, the German movement went overextended itself, as already illustrated. 
Taking these considerations into account, a strict liability regime should, with 
regards to the rule of stricter liability under common law, treat the commercial release 
and sale of GM agricultural products as an “escape” of a substance which is dangerous; 
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and secondly, as used in the common law system, the pure economic loss doctrine 
should be consequently implemented as a liability cap.  
With respect to the requirement of reasonable foreseeability in the tort of 
nuisance, it has been proven that the risk assessment of GMOs presently exists only in 
an early development stage.  Furthermore, it was shown that the risk assessment is 
connected to the requirement of reasonable foreseeability in the tort of negligence.  With 
regards to the poorly conceived risk assessment, it can be concluded that the reasonable 
foreseeability requirement is more likely, in the face of uncertainty, to mainly shield the 
biotechnology industry and farmers from liability in the tort of negligence, rather than 
serve as a means to encourage them to research and reduce risks.  
The examination of the North American cases and litigation has also shown that 
the chances for a conventional or organic farmer to have a promising claim for 
economical damages are relatively marginal due to matters of reasoning or the 
consistent consideration of the pure economic loss doctrine.  Taking into account the 
aims of tort law, it seems as unreasonable to shift the burden of damage to a small 
amount of organic and conventional farmers without any promising liability options.  
However, with regard to the ‘pure economic loss’ doctrine, it seems as accurate to 
prohibit endless and exclamatory liability claims under common law.  
On the other hand, the thesis has shown that the German GenTG offers a 
decisive liability basis for claims with regard to all five types of economic damages.  In 
particular, the German special liability law resigns completely to use the pure economic 
loss doctrine in cases of agricultural GMO damage.  Consequently, it is not surprising 
that the liability resulting out of the application of § 36 a GenTG can be described as 
incalculable and unpredictable.  The fact that the civil liability for pure economic loss is 
often incalculable and unpredictable substantially explains why Canadian and American 
courts have used the pure economic loss doctrine to exclude liability for the fourth and 
fifth scenario.  However, the German general liability basis of claims in § 823 I BGB, 
prohibits such extending claims due to its conception. 
Un
ive
rsi
ty 
of 
Ca
pe
 To
wn
- 75 - 
 
Therefore, the German GenTG seems to be susceptible to the limitations of possible 
liability claims.  The aims of tort law demand a balanced risk and damage allocation.  It 
seems, due to current technological achievements in the field of storing and transport, 
impossible to prohibit the mixing of GM seed with non-GM seed which may lead to the 
loss of an organic label as a result.  Furthermore, the decision of a farmer to resign to 
plant organic plants in the future is a personal choice and consequently hard to be 
proven. That is why both scenarios should not lead to any liability. 
In summary, the comparison has shown that North American law, as well as 
German law, have weaknesses in sufficiently addressing the problems arising out of the 
agricultural application of GMOs.  It was further shown that GMOs have a rising impact 
on society and farming.  Due to the relationship of this GMO issue to many people and 
its high economic interests, it is an accurate assessment that the legislature, as the 
representative of the citizen, has to take the occurring problems into consideration and 
create applicable, consistent rules.  
Jeremy Rifkin, one of the first GMO opponents in the US, stated in 1999 that 
‘liability is going to be the Achilles’ heel of the biotechnology industry.  Foreign genes 
are a smoking gun.  They are going to flow all over the place.  Claims for damages 
could come from gardeners or organic farmers who find they are unable to sell their 
crops.  All that has to happen is for a gene to turn up that you did not want.  The overall 
claims for damages could make the recent litigation associated with smoking pale in 
comparison’.457  If the above scenario manifests, any liability regime will be more 
appropriately able to deal with these matters if the recommended changes in this thesis 
were implemented into current law.  
                                                 
457
 J Rifkin ‘Industry critic warns that damages claims 'could run into millions' (1999) 398 Nature 656. 
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